The Psychology of Logic and the Logic of Psychology: Critique of the Psychology of Reasoning

Abstract

The argument so far has been that Galileo’s Dialogue has classic significance for science, and important implications for the philosophy of science, for the historiography of science, and for the history and historiography of philosophy. It has also emerged that reasoning is the book’s central feature, both at the level of scientific practice, and at the level of philosophical reflection. It follows that reasoning, which of course is not to be confused with rationalism, is an essential feature of scientific rationality. However, though we have thereby exhibited the structure of scientific rationality, we have not yet examined the structure of this structure. That is, so far we have examined the macro-structure of scientific rationality, but not its micro-structure. In order to do the latter, we need to study the finer details of the reasoning in Galileo’s book. There is, however, an additional independent reason why it is desirable to undertake this study, namely that it provides materials for and examples of a concrete approach to the theory of reasoning, and to the foundations of a reformed science of logic. This I now proceed to show.