Scientific Judgment: Creativity and Discovery in Scientific Thought

Abstract

Although creativity in science, mathematics, and technology is crucial to the fundamental processes of discovery and invention, it has largely been ignored by the philosophy of science, or it has been regarded as a question which lies outside the domain of philosophy of science proper. This has been the scandal of contemporary philosophy of science. But it has not been a hidden scandal, tacitly acknowledged and whispered about behind closed minds. Rather, it has been an open scandal, indeed, a theoretically justified one, so that its justification has made it appear non-scandalous, and even reasonable. Two questions present themselves here: first, how did the scandal arise? How is it that such an admittedly important feature of science as creativity, in its distinctive scientific modes as discovery and invention, could be excluded from systematic treatment by the very discipline whose task it is to understand science? And what rationales have been given to justify this exclusion? Second, if discovery and invention are to be proper subjects for the philosophy of science, how are they to be treated? How shall they be systematically included? What frameworks are necessary for understanding this feature of science?