Abstract
In the introduction, I hinted at a four-step master argument that would have the conclusion that it is unreasonable now for human beings to believe any of the three versions of moderate skepticism about physical objects, the past, the future, and other minds. As we shall see as I develop and explain the argument here, it has the beneficial side effect of also refuting skepticism about induction for us now.
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References
H. Feigl, ‘Validation and Vindication: An Analysis of the Nature and the Limits of Ethical Arguments’, in W. Sellars and J. Hospers (eds.), Readings in Ethical Theory, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1952, p. 674.
Cf. W. Salmon, ‘The Justification of Inductive Rules of Inference’, in I. Lakatos (ed.), The Problem of Inductive Logic, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1968, pp. 34- 35.
W. Sellars, Philosophical Perspectives, Springfield, 111.: Charles C. Thomas, 1967, p. 410.
H. Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951, p. 245.
See H. Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938, sections 39, 42.
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© 1980 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Cornman, J.W. (1980). An Argument for the Explanatory Foundational Theory and Against Skepticism. In: Skepticism, Justification, and Explanation. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 18. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8958-0_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8958-0_1
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