On ‘Normative’ Rational-Choice Theories of Politics

Abstract

Nearly all rational-choice or economic theories of politics (and most of economic theory itself) are founded on assumptions about individual preferences, including the assumption (usually tacit) that these preferences do not change with time. This assumption of fixed preference may be appropriate in the case of explanatory theories of social phenomena which are narrowly confined in place and especially time. For example if one wanted to explain the process of bargaining between representatives of unions and management who are trying to settle a wage dispute in a contemporary advanced industrial society, then it may be plausible to assume, and usually it is assumed, that each side acts so as to maximise some fixed utility function (a discounted function of its own future income or profits, for example) — though even here, I think, a more plausible approach would be to assume that each side is a ‘satisficer’ and that the set of outcomes it deems ‘satisfactory’ changes with time. Clearly, the longer the span of time to which an explanatory theory is to be applied, the less plausible, generally speaking, is the assumption of fixed preferences. But a more fundamental and serious problem arises in connection with the use of this assumption in normative political or economic theories, especially when these are used (as they commonly are) to justify or recommend an institution, practice, rule, new technology or whatever, which will remain in operation for a considerable period of time.