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The Proposition in Terms of Belief

  • Paul Gochet
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 98)

Abstract

In ‘On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean’ (1919), Russell foresaw a way of approaching the problem of defining the proposition and of determining its ontological status that we have not yet discussed. The paper opens with the following statement: “A proposition may be defined as: What we believe when we believe truly or fasely”.1 Several contemporary philosophers have preceded or followed Russell along this path full of obstacles.

Keywords

True Belief Intentional State Propositional Attitude Intentional Object Mental Entity 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1980

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul Gochet
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyState University of LiègeBelgium

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