Abstract
In 1900, in A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, Russell made the following assertion: “That all sound philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions is a truth too evident, perhaps, to demand a proof”1 Forty years later, the interest aroused by this notion had not decreased. C. J. Ducasse wrote in the Journal of Philosophy: “There is perhaps no question more basic for the theory of knowledge than that of the nature of propositions and their relations to judgments, sentences, facts and inferences”.2 Today, the great number of publications on the subject is proof that it is still of interest. One of the problems raised by propositions, the problem of determining whether propositions, statements or sentences are the primary bearers of truth and falsity, is even in the eyes of Bar-Hillel, “one of the major items that the future philosophy of language will have to discuss”.3
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References
B. Russell, A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, Cambridge University Press, 1900, p. 8.
C.-J. Ducasse, ‘Propositions, Opinions, Sentences and Facts’, Journal of Philosophy 37 (1940) 701.
Y. Bar-Hillel, ‘Universal Semantics and Philosophy of Language’, in J. Puhvel (ed.), Substance and Structure of Language, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1969, pp. 16–17.
Ph. Devaux, Bertrand Russell ou la Paix dans la vérité, Seghers, Paris, 1967, p. 59.
P. F. Strawson, ‘Introduction’, in P. F. Strawson (ed.), Philosophical Logic, Oxford University Press, 1967, p. 1.
B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1952, p. 44.
G. E. Moore, ‘The Nature of Judgment’, Mind 8 (1899) 180.
A. Montefiore, A Modern Introduction to Moral Philosophy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958, p. 1.
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B. Russell, ‘On Denoting’, reprinted in H. Feigl and W. Seilars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis, Appel ton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1949, p. 108.
W. Stegmüller, Main Currents in Contemporary German, British and American Philosophy, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1969, p. 54.
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Y. Bar-Hillel, ‘Do Natural Languages Contain Paradoxes?’, Studium generale, (1966) 393. Reprinted in Aspects of language, North Holland, Amsterdam 1970; see p. 276.
J. L. Austin, ‘Ifs and Cans’, Proceedings of the British Academy, Vol. XLII, Oxford University Press, London, 1956, pp. 131–132. Reprinted in J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, Oxford University Press, 2nd. edn., 1970; see p. 232.
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R. Carnap, Meaning and Necessity (1947) University of Chicago Press, enlarged edn., 1956, § 5 and § 33.
A. Church, ‘Proposition’, Encyclopedia Britannica, U.S.A., Vol. 18, 1965, p. 560.
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D. Davidson, ‘On Saying That’ Synthese 19, (1968) 132.
Z. Vendler, ‘Les Performatifs en perspective’, Langage 17, (1970) 89–90.
P. T. Geach, ‘Assertion’, Philosophical Review 74, (1965) 452–453.
For a study of the proposition in ancient and medieval philosophy, the reader is referred to G. Nuchelmans’ important monograph Theories of Proposition. Ancient and Medieval Conceptions of the Bearers of Truth and Falsity, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1973.
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Gochet, P. (1980). Introduction. In: Outline of a Nominalist Theory of Propositions. Synthese Library, vol 98. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8949-8_1
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