Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Outline of a Nominalist Theory of Propositions pp 149–184Cite as

Propositions and Indirect Discourse

  • Chapter

  • 79 Accesses

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 98))

Abstract

For a long while the pioneers of contemporary symbolic logic concentrated their research on formal reasonings whose only logical constants were the traditional connectives ‘if… then’, ‘and’, ‘not’, ‘or’ and the quantifiers. These are, furthermore, the only notions which are required to analyse a mathematical proof, with the proviso that the ‘∈’ of set theory is added to the list of constants.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. J. Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief, Cornell University Press, 1962.

    Google Scholar 

  2. G. Frege, ‘On Sense and Nominatum’, in H. Feigl and V. Sellars (eds.), Philosophical Analysisy p. 93.

    Google Scholar 

  3. G. Bachelard, Le Nouvel Esprit Scientifique, Alean, Paris, 1939, p. 157.

    Google Scholar 

  4. B. Mates, ‘Synonymity’, Semantics and Philosophy of Language, ed. by Linsky, The University of Illinois, Urbana, 1952, p. 125.

    Google Scholar 

  5. R. Camap, ‘On Belief Sentences: Reply to Alonzo Church’, Supplement C to Meaning and Necessity 1956, p. 231.

    Google Scholar 

  6. A. Church, ‘On Carnap’s Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief’, Analysis (1950) 97–99. Reprinted in M. Macdonald (ed.), Philosophy and Analysis. Blackwell, Oxford, 1954.

    Google Scholar 

  7. I. Scheffler, ‘An Inscriptional Approach to Belief Sentences’, Analysis (1953–1954) 87.

    Google Scholar 

  8. W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object, p. 215.

    Google Scholar 

  9. A. N. Prior, Objects of Thought, in P. T. Geach and A. J. P. Kenny (eds.), Oxford Clarendon Press, 1971, p. 19.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Prior, Ibid., p. 17.

    Google Scholar 

  11. A. N. Prior, ‘Oratio Obliqua’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 1963, p. 118.

    Google Scholar 

  12. A.N. Prior Objects of Thought, p. 19.

    Google Scholar 

  13. A. N. Prior ‘Is the Concept of Referential Opacity Really Necessary?’, Acta Philosophica Fennica (1962) 190.

    Google Scholar 

  14. L. J. Cohen, ‘Critical Notice: Objects of Thought’, Mind (1973) 135.

    Google Scholar 

  15. L. J. Cohen, The Diversity of Meanings, Methuen, London, 1962, p. 202.

    Google Scholar 

  16. T. M. Simpson, ‘On a nominalistic analysis of non-extensional contexts’, Logique et Analyse 59–60, (1972) 496.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Simpson, Ibid., p. 498.

    Google Scholar 

  18. Simpson, Ibid., p. 499.

    Google Scholar 

  19. G. Frege, ‘On Sense and Nominatum’ in H. Feigl and W. Sellars (eds.), Readings in Philosophical Analysis, 1949, p. 85–102.

    Google Scholar 

  20. T. M. Simpson, ‘Sobre la eliminación de los contextos oblicuos’, Critica (1967) 21–37.

    Google Scholar 

  21. A. Schilpp, The Philosophy of Rudolph Carnap, The Library of Living Philosophers, La Salle, 1968, pp. 889–900.

    Google Scholar 

  22. W. V. O. Quine, ‘Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes’ Journal of Philosophy (1956), reprinted in The Ways of Paradox, Random Press, 1966, pp. 183–194.

    Google Scholar 

  23. E. Bach, ‘Nouns and Noun Phrases’, in Urtiversals in Linguistic Theory, 1968, p. 106–107.

    Google Scholar 

  24. B. Loar, ‘Reference and Propositional Attitudes’, Philosophical Review (1972) 52.

    Google Scholar 

  25. D. Kaplan, ‘Quantifying,’ In Synthese 19 (1968) 178–214 reprinted in Reference and Modality OUP Oxford, 1971, ed. Linksy, pp. 112–144.

    Google Scholar 

  26. R. Montague, ‘On the Nature of Certain Philosophical Entities’, rep. in R. Montague, Formal Philosophy 1974, R. Thomason (cd.) Yale Univ. Press, p. 165.

    Google Scholar 

  27. D. Davidson, ‘On Saying that’, Synthese 19 (1968) 133–136.

    Google Scholar 

  28. Kaplan, Op. cit., p. 185. Reference and Modality, p. 119.

    Google Scholar 

  29. A. N. Prior, Time and Modality, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1957, p. 57.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Kaplan. Op. cit., p. 189–190. Reference and Modality, p. 124.

    Google Scholar 

  31. J. Hintikka, ‘Modality as referential multiplicity’, Ajatus 20, (1957) p. 61.

    Google Scholar 

  32. J. Hintikka, ‘Meaning as Multiple Reference’, Akten des XIX Int. Kongress für Philosophie, Wien 1968, Tome I. p. 340–345.

    Google Scholar 

  33. J. Hintikka, ‘Existential and Uniqueness Presuppositions’, Models for Modalities, Rcidel, Dordrecht, 1969, p. 133.

    Google Scholar 

  34. D. Føllesdal, Referential Opacity, Oslo, 1966.

    Google Scholar 

  35. L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, Oxford, p. 44–94.

    Google Scholar 

  36. J. Hintikka, ‘Grammar and Logic, Some Borderline Problems’, in J. Hintikka, J. Moravcsik, P. Suppes (eds.), Approaches to Natural language, Reidcl, Dordrecht 1973, p. 198.

    Google Scholar 

  37. W. V. O. Quine, ‘Propositional Objects’ reprinted in Ontological Relativity and other Essays, Columbia Univ. Press, 1969, pp. 147–148.

    Google Scholar 

  38. Quine, Op. cit., p. 154.

    Google Scholar 

  39. J. Hintikka, ‘The Semantics of Modal Notions and the indeterminacy of ontology’, Synthese (1970) 412. Reprinted in D. Davidson and G. Harman (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1972.

    Google Scholar 

  40. L. Linsky, On Referring, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1967, p. 115.

    Google Scholar 

  41. Linsky, Ibid., p. 115.

    Google Scholar 

  42. E. M. Zemach, ‘Reference and Belief’, Analysis (1969) 11–15.

    Google Scholar 

  43. P. T. Strawson, ‘Phrase et Acte de Parole’, Language (1970) 28.

    Google Scholar 

  44. A. C. Genova, ‘Jonesese and substitutivity’ Analysis (1971) 101.

    Google Scholar 

  45. R. Montague, ‘Pragmatics’, 1968, reprinted in Formal Philosophy.

    Google Scholar 

  46. Montague, Op. cit., p. 98.

    Google Scholar 

  47. R. Montague, ‘Pragmatics and Intensional Logic’, 1969, reprinted in Formal Philosophy, p. 122.

    Google Scholar 

  48. B. Partec, ‘Semantics-Mathematics or Psychology’, forthcoming in the Proceedings of the Konstanz Conference, 1979.

    Google Scholar 

  49. A. Kasher, ‘Formal Semantics of Natural Languages’, Philosophica 18 (1976) 149.

    Google Scholar 

  50. T. Bürge, ‘Belief and Synonym’, Journal of Philosophy (1978) 126.

    Google Scholar 

  51. Bürge, Op. cit., p. 138.

    Google Scholar 

  52. R. E. Jennings and P. K. Schotch, ‘De Re and De Dicto Beliefs’, Logique et Analyse 84 (1978)455.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, State University of Liège, Belgium

    Paul Gochet

Authors
  1. Paul Gochet
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1980 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Gochet, P. (1980). Propositions and Indirect Discourse. In: Outline of a Nominalist Theory of Propositions. Synthese Library, vol 98. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8949-8_11

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8949-8_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-009-8951-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-8949-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation