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Propositions and Indirect Discourse

  • Paul Gochet
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 98)

Abstract

For a long while the pioneers of contemporary symbolic logic concentrated their research on formal reasonings whose only logical constants were the traditional connectives ‘if… then’, ‘and’, ‘not’, ‘or’ and the quantifiers. These are, furthermore, the only notions which are required to analyse a mathematical proof, with the proviso that the ‘∈’ of set theory is added to the list of constants.

Keywords

Propositional Attitude Epistemic Logic Intensional Logic Intensional Context Belief Context 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1980

Authors and Affiliations

  • Paul Gochet
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyState University of LiègeBelgium

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