Abstract
It is quite customary, in the conceptual analysis of causality, to consider this notion as essentially or intrinsically connected with the notion of time, such a connection being the following: if we claim that an event a is the cause of another event b, we inevitably mean by this that a temporally precedes or at least does not temporally succeed b.
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© 1980 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Agazzi, E. (1980). Time and Causality. In: Dalla Chiara, M.L. (eds) Italian Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 47. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8937-5_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8937-5_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1073-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-8937-5
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive