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The PKI and the Abangan

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The Social Evolution of Indonesia

Part of the book series: Studies in Social History ((SISH,volume 5))

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Abstract

Much of the discussion focusing on Indonesian developments during the period 1949–65 has been in terms of either a gradual radical-ization, a shift to the left, a communist preparation for a power takeover or combinations of these. These approaches, however, still fail to bring clarity to a number of matters — how the PKI could be so expeditiously liquidated, for instance — nor do they evaluate the actual power relations of that time. Such factors as the growing power of the military and the social conservatism among a majority of the neo-priyayi elite are often underestimated while the strength of the Indonesian popular mass movement and the revolutionary zeal of its leaders are often overestimated. Not that the literature has not given ample attention to all such problems. Authors such as McVey, Mortimer, Hindley, Gunawan and others have examined a range of deficiencies peculiar to the Indonesian communist movement, such as: its distinctly nationalist orientation; its adaptation towards the abangan; its lack of class awareness; the frequent lack of fighting spirit shown by its members; its extraordinary moderation and inclinations towards social integration.1 However, these authors have still not entirely rectified the general picture that pertains of the period, particularly the Guided Democracy years and the radical Soekarno-PKI alliance.

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Notes

  1. McVey, ‘Indonesian Communism and the Transition’, in: Communist Strategies, pp. 148–195; Id., ‘Indonesian Communism’; Id., ‘Indonesian Communism and China’; Mortimer, Ideology, Id., Indonesian Communism’, Hindley, Communist Party, Gunawan, Kudetd; Hering, ‘Sukarnos Sturz’.

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  2. Carr, Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. I, Chs 1–5; Deutscher, Prophet Armed, Ch. 9; Trotzky, History of the Russian Revolution; Bettelheim, Les luttes de classes en URRS, Première pé-riode 1917–1923. For China and Vietnam see: Chs 2 and 5. For Cuba: Ruiz, Cuba; The Making of a Revolution; Morray, Second Revolution in Cuba; Snethlage, Cuba.

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  3. McVey, Rise, pp. 343–346.

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  4. Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 290 ff; Mortimer, ‘Class’, in: Indonesia, 8, Oct. 1969, pp. 8–9.

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  5. Deutscher, Prophet Outcast, pp. 198 ff; Abendroth, Aufstieg, p.61; Id., Sozialgeschichte, pp. 116 ff; Hunt, German Social Democracy, pp. 241 ff; Tjaden, Struktur, pp. 269 ff.

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  6. For the pre-war period: Haithcox, Communism and Nationalism. Further: Retzlaff, ‘Revisionism and Dogmatism’, in: Communist Revolution, pp. 316 ff; Franda, Radical Politics; Sen Gupta, Communism in Indian Politics, pp. 42 ff.

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  7. Hindley, Communist Party, Ch. 13; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, Ch. 6; McVey, ‘Indonesian Communism and the Transition’, in: Communist Strategies, p. 155.

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  8. McVey, Id., p. 152; Feith, Decline, pp. 187 ff; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 106–107, 247, 400, 402. The nationalist trade unions took the initiative to occupy Dutch enterprises in 1957 and British enterprises in 1963, not the communist labour organizations. Lev, Transition, p. 33; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, p. 222. The PKI imposed the modern trade union policy on the SOBSI in the context of the national united front. Another problem was that of the competition of non-communist unions. Hindley, Communist Party, pp. 142 ff.

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  9. Id., p. 147, 155.

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  10. Mortimer, Ideology, Ch. 6, p. 4; Id., Indonesian Communism, p. 410.

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  11. Hindley, Communist Party, pp. 160–180; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 278 ff;Id., Indonesian Communist Party, p. 10. The authorities were not very keen on pressurizing the peasants; indeed, they were less able to do so than to control the urban workers. McVey, ‘Indonesian Communism and the Transition’, in: Communist Strategies, p. 179.

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  12. Mortimer, Indonesian Communist Party, p. 6. Scott and Kerkvliet emphasize the patron-client relationship between the PKI and the peasants through village elites. Scott and Kerkvliet, ‘Polities’, in: JSEAS, IV, 2, Sept. 1973, pp. 258–259. In the principalities in particular social uprootings and class differentiation started earlier than elsewhere on Java. One can draw a historical line backwards to: the revolutionary explosion July 1946; the Sarekat Islam stirrings from 1911–19 and later; and forward to the unilateral action of the BTI in 1964 in these areas. See for pre-war social relations: van Mook, ‘Kuta Gede’, in: Indonesian Town, pp. 287 ff.

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  13. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 408 ff; McVey, Indonesian Communism, pp. 14 ff.

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  14. Mortimer, Indonesian Communist Party, pp. 42 ff, 50 ff; Id., Indonesian Communism, pp. 321 ff.

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  15. Anderson, Java, pp. 212, 255 ff. Concerning the Pesindo, one of the constituting elements of the PKI fusion in 1948: Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 31 ff.

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  16. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 33–34.

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  17. Mortimer, Ideology, Ch. 2, p. 80.

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  18. The enormous military apparatus was part of this bureaucratic sponge which provided a social safety that was not available elsewhere. There was a qualitative social difference between the Indonesian and the Kuomintang army with its basis of pauper soldiers. Not only did the PKI prove incapable of penetrating the bureaucratic centre, but it did not reach the neo-priyayi (intellectual) elite. McVey, ‘Indonesian Communism’, in: China in Crisis, II, p. 30;Id., ‘Indonesian Communism’, in: Communist Strategies, pp. 153, 159 ff, 168. With regard to the social accommodation of the PKI top, Mortimer notes: ‘Some of the PKI-leaders, had softened in their views of the “national bourgeoisie” [i.e. the neo-priyayi top, in the PKI analysis], themselves the victims of a subtle “bourgeoisification” [we would prefer neo-priyayilication’J process brought on by the comtorts attaching to their prestigious posts in the Guided Democracy complex’. Mortimer, ‘Downfall’, in: Socialist Register, 1967, p. 212.

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  19. McVey, Indonesian Communism, pp. 6 ff.

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  20. Id., p. 13; Compare: Sartono, ‘Agrarian Radicalism’, in: Culture, pp. 121; Mayor Polak, Herleving van het hindoeisme.

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  21. Geertz, ‘Primordial Sentiments’, in: Old Societies, pp. 105–157; Mortimer ‘Gass’, in: Indonesia, 8, Oct. 1969, pp. 1–20.

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  22. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, p. 26.

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  23. Hindley, Communist Party, pp. 50 ff; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 42 ff.

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  24. Rocamora, ‘Partai Nasional Indonesia’, in: Indonesia, 10, Oct. 1970, pp. 148, 165.

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  25. Id., pp. 166 ff. According to Ward, one should not over-estimate the leftist tendencies in the PNI, as does Rocamora. Ward, 1971 Election, pp. 134 ff.

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  26. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 66 ff, 87 ff.

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  27. Lev, Transition, pp. 59 ff, 182 ff, 202, 206–207, 214, 224 ff, 250; Feith, ‘Dynamics’, in: Indonesia, pp. 325 ff. Hering and Willis, p. 51–52.

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  28. Lev, Transition, pp. 211 ff: ‘… each party was not so much defending the political system which sustained it as trying to protect its own position in whatever system happened to emerge’: Lev, Id., p. 238. Of course, the PSI and the Masyumi offered resistance. Lev, Id., P. 212.

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  29. Lev, Id., pp. 1–2. For the regionalist revolt of 1957–58 the central aim was combating communism. Lev, Id., pp. 37–38.

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  30. It started early. The PKI did not react to the harsh repression by the Sukiman government during the August 1951 strike wave. This was followed by uncritical and timid support of the PNI. No resistance was put up either to the military taking over the occupied Dutch enterprises at the end of 1957 or against the proclamation of the state of war and siege in the same year providing ample scope for anti PKI measures. Feith, Decline, pp. 187 ff; Hind-ley, Communist Party, pp. 236 ff; Lev, Transition, pp. 212, 268–269, 274, 275; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 71 ff, 120–121; McVey, ‘Indonesian Communism and the Transition’, in: Communist Strategies, pp. 152 ff, 163.

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  31. Lev, Transition, pp. 57–58. The trade union movement should also have been absorbed by the national unity organization in the making. Hawkins, ‘Labour’, in: Indonesia, p. 268.

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  32. Lev, Id., pp. 201 ff; Legge, Sukarno, Ch. 11; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, p. 70. In August 1960 Soekarno dropped the idea of a ‘single state party\but continued striving for a nationalist unity movement through the ‘National Front’. Mortimer, Id., pp. 100–101.

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  33. The state of war and siege (March 1957) immediately initiated repressive measures which directly hit the SOBSI. Lev, Transition, pp. 63–64; Feith, Decline, p. 596; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 104 ff. The nationalization of foreign enterprises under military direction also weakened the trade union movement. Hawkins, ‘Labour’, in: Indonesia, pp. 265 ff. The PKI had very little freedom of movement during Guided Democracy. McVey, ‘Indonesian Communism and the Transition’, in: Communist Strategies, p. 174; Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, p. 168.

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  34. Id., p. 402.

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  35. Id., pp. 36–37, 79 ff, 175 ff, 221 ff, 237 ff, 375 ff; Id., ‘Downfall’, in: Socialist Register, 1969, pp. 203 ff.

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  36. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 366–367. Mortimer’s estimate of the total following of the PKI and affiliated organizations is ± 20,000,000.

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  37. Id., pp. 209 ff, 221 ff, 237 ff, 401 ff.

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  38. Legge, Sukarno, pp. 326, 378 ff; Penders, Life, pp. 202–203. See also: Federspiel, ‘Army’, in: PA, 46, 3, Fall 1973, pp. 407–408. Legge emphasizes the theme of Soekarno as a conservative manipulator. Id., p. 383. Compare to: Mortimer, ‘Downfall’, in: Socialist Register, 1969, p. 201.

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  39. Hindley, ‘President Sukarno and the Communists’, in: American Political Science Review, LVI, 4, 1962, pp. 915 ff; Palmier’s (Communists, Ch. 15) phrase is ‘Emasculating the PKI’.

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  40. For a coherent view of Soekarno’s last radical phase: Legge, Sukarno, Ch. 14 ‘Foreign adventure and domestic balance’ to be supplemented by: Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 22, 79 ff, 178 ff, 209, 365. In 1960 Aidit stated clearly that the party should subordinate its class duties to its national ones. Id., p. 160.

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  41. Further research is needed for the total process of re-orientation and regrouping of all PSI, Masyumi, Christian, right wing PNI and related forces, a process which occurred under the protection of the army which supported every anti-communist action and promised solidarity in the event of a ‘showdown’. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 374–375.

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  42. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, Chs 5 and 9.

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  43. Mortimer, Id., pp. 309 ff, 376 ff, 403.

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  44. Mortimer, Id., pp. 126, 166 ff, 321 ff, 376, 381. For the primacy of foreign policy: Id., Chs 4 and 5; Legge, Sukarno, pp. 364 ff. The anti-Malaysia policy of the PKI was quite moderate. Mortimer, Id., pp. 233 ff.

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  45. ‘By 1963 the party’s worship [of Soekarno] was becoming almost idolatrous’, Mortimer states (Indonesian Communism, p. 88). Aidit dropped the principle of communist hegemony in the struggle for socialism, conceding that Indonesia could follow the road to socialism under the leadership of the President and his circle. Mortimer,Id., p. 170. The primary aim of the party for 1965, the crushing of the ‘kabir’ (the capitalist bureaucrats), was essentially directed against the army, not against the bureaucrats who had close connection with Soekarno. For the actions in 1965: Mortimer, Id., pp. 375–387. As Nasakom did not tolerate class polarization, the PKI tended to lose ground. According to Utrecht (De onderbroken revolutie, p. 211) the PKI was forced to some kind of offensive action in order not to lose the village proletariat.

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  46. Mortimer, Indonesian Communist Party, pp. 32–33; Id., Indonesian Communism, pp. 123 ff, 169–174. In this respect mention should be made of Aidit’s theory (1963) of the double character of the state — a progressive aspect, a link with the people combined with a reactionary aspect. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 133 ff.

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  47. The PKI leadership did not aim at conquering state power in September 1965; it wanted to keep the army from liquidating the party after Soekarno’s death. Mortimer, Ideology, Ch.9, p.43.

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  48. There is no adequate analysis of the factors that caused the inevitable showdown to be delayed so long. Nasution’s notorious vacillating character was certainly one factor. On the other hand, there was a decisive factor in the preparation of the counter revolution: the homogenization of the army elite through the growing strength of Javanese (and Javanist) generals (and other officers). The defeat of the regionalists increased the power of the Javanese military centre. The only thing lacking was a leader. After 1965, the Javanization process continued steadily. McVey ‘Postrevolutionary Transformation’, II, in: Indonesia, 13, April 1972, pp. 171 ff. Further: Indonesia, 3, April 1967, pp. 205–206; Id., 4, Oct. 1967, pp. 227–229; Id., 7, April 1969, pp. 195–201; Id., 10, Oct. 1970, pp. 195–208.

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  49. Kwesi Prah, Social Background of Coups d’Etats.

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  50. Mortimer, Indonesian Communist Party, pp. 50–52. We do not underestimate the fierce repression by PNI-forces on Bali. Paget, Youth, p. 196.

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  51. Mortimer dubbs it ‘hubris’. ‘Downfall’, p. 205.

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  52. For a survey of events and arguments; Crouch, ‘Another Look at the Indonesian ‘Coup’’, in: Indonesia, 15, April 1973, pp. 10–20; Van der Kroef, ‘Interpretations’, in: PA, XLIII, 4, Winter, 1970–71, pp. 557–577. The best analysis available is: Anderson and McVey, Preliminary Analysis. Oey Hong Lee, ‘Soekarno’, in: JSEAS, VII, 1, March 1976, pp. 119–135. See also: Hering, ‘Sukarnos Sturz’.

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  53. Mortimer, ‘Downfall’, p. 213. In Central and East Java the army leadership left much scope for local santri initiative in the mass murders. In West Java with its Muslim strongholds, it kept anti-communist violence under strict control; otherwise Muslim aggression could have become dangerous.

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  54. Mortimer, Indonesian Communism, pp. 389 ff; Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval, pp. 141 ff. Cf. Schlereth and Bintang, Analyse.

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  55. This complex of factors have not been sufficiently dealt with by Mortimer (Ch. ‘The Final Year, Climax and Catastrophe’, pp. 364 ff) not to speak of less serious works: Brackman (The Communist Collapse), Hughes (Indonesian Upheaval) and Palmier (Communists).

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  56. Van Doom, Orde, pp. 93–94.

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  57. For the suppression of PKI resistance after 1965: van der Kroef, ‘Indonesian Communism since the 1965 Coup’, in: PA, XLII, 1, Spring 1970, pp. 34–60.

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  58. McVey, Indonesian Communism, pp. 21–22; Mortimer, Indonesian Communist Party, pp. 67–68.

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  59. McVey, ‘Nationalism’, in: Soekarno, Nationalism, pp. 26–33.

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  60. Mortimer, ‘The Downfall’, in: Socialist Register, 1969, pp. 215–216; Id., ‘The Nature of the Indonesian Experiment’, in: Showcase State, pp. 57 ff.

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  61. For the modern neo-colonial climate: Anderson, ‘Notes’, in: Political Power, pp. 282 ff, 319–321. See also: Showcase State, Chs 2 and 5; Ward, 1971 Election, pp. 196 ff; Gregory, ‘New Order Indonesia’, in: Kabar Seberang, 2, 1977, pp. 12 ff; May, Indonesian Tragedy; Repression and Exploitation.

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  64. For PKI and other resistance on Java and Javanese parts of Sumatra: Tien jaar onrecht, pp. 150 ff.

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  1. Fritjof Tichelman
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© 1980 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers bv, The Hague

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Tichelman, F. (1980). The PKI and the Abangan. In: The Social Evolution of Indonesia. Studies in Social History, vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8896-5_15

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8896-5_15

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