The Epistemology of Inductive Reasoning in Leibniz

  • Nicholas Rescher
Part of the The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science book series (WONS, volume 18)


The closing sections of the preceding chapter have examined Leibniz’s approach to the epistemology of particular truth in sensory observations. The present chapter will turn to his epistemology of general truth in scientific theorizing. It will emerge that, on both sides alike — the general as well as the particular — considerations of coherentist fit and systematic unity will play the decisive role.


Inductive Reasoning General Truth High Praise Present Chapter Universal Proposition 
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  1. I. Hacking, “The Leibniz-Carnap Program for Inductive Logic”, Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), 597 – 610.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1981

Authors and Affiliations

  • Nicholas Rescher
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of PittsburghUSA

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