Reference and Relational Belief: On Causality and the Pragmatics of ‘Referring to’ and ‘Believing about’

Abstract

In this paper I would like to talk about the speech-act of identifying reference (‘referring’, for short), and the way of having an object in mind which Quine terms ‘relational belief’.¹ These two notions admit of parallel causal theories. For relational belief, the view is that such a belief concerning individual r requires a causal connection between r and the psychological state constituting the belief. For referring, the view is that the speech-act requires a causal connection between the given act and the individual thereby referred to. These two causal theories are related: given a Gricean (or Searlean) characterization of the speech-act of referring, the causal theory of relational belief entails the causal theory of referring. The argument is this: If we characterize referring as an act of meaning — à la Grice and Searle — then for speaker S to refer to referent r, S must have some complex intention concerning r. Moreover, this will be a relational intention concerning r; this is clearly required by the transparent occurrence of ‘r’ in ‘S is referring to r’² A relational intention concerning r requires a relational belief concerning r. Hence, for S to refer to r, S must have a relational belief concerning r. In this way, then, given the causal theory of relational belief we have as well the causal theory of referring.

This paper is a descendant of ‘On Referring and Causality’, presented at the 1976 Eastern Division APA meetings, James Higginbotham commenting. It owes much to conversations with Murray Kiteley, Herbert Heidelberger, John Searle, Christopher Peacocke, Alan Reeves, Stephen White, Ralph Kennedy, and Thomas Ballmer.