Abstract
Any attempt to conflate phenomenology and the speculative metaphysics with its “Great Chain of Being”, so aptly labeled by Kant and so admirably pursued through history by Lovejoy, is bound to be a risky venture. Husserl’s critique of Weltanschauung theory has been rightly interpreted as an attack on much of what was traditionally taken as speculative metaphysics. But when the phenomenologist involved is Max Scheler, the difficulties might appear to be more serious, since he seems to combine, with a considerable degree of intention, both propensities: the methodical, analytical style of experience-based phenomenology, and the imaginative, constructive systembuilding of classical rationalistic thought. This is not even to consider the question of whether Scheler’s use of phenomenology, clearly deviant from Husserl’s prescriptions, warrants that formal designation. Suffice it to say that Scheler was an active participant in the phenomenological movement and was markedly influential in its development. His initially transient, and then, in his later years, rather explicit involvement in metaphysics, makes him indeed a rather interesting test case as to the possibility of combining phenomenology and metaphysics, although hardly the last word.1
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Notes
For helpful discussions of Scheler’s philosophical orientation see Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement, Vol. I (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960) pp. 220–270. Also: Eugene Kelly, Max Scheler (Boston: Twayne, 1977).
Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), p. 52.
Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), p. 58.
Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), p. 59.
Arthur O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), pp. 53–58.
Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and non-Formal Ethics of Values (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 86–99.
Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and non-Formal Ethics of Values (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 100.
Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and non-Formal Ethics of Values (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973), p. 27.
Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and non-Formal Ethics of Values (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 572–583.
Max Scheler, ‘Vorbilder und Führer,’ Schriften aus dem Nachlass, (Gesammelte Werke, Vol. X) (ed. by M. Scheler) (Bern: Francke, 1957), pp. 255–343.
Max Scheler, The Nature of Sympathy (New Haven, Yale U. Press, 1954), cht. 3: also, Formalism, pp. 526–532.
Formalism, pp. 299–309.
Ibid., pp. 328–343.
Nature of Sympathy , pp. 142–161.
`Zur Funktion des Geschlechtlichen Schamgefühles,’ Nachlass, 65–147.
Formalism, p. 51.
Formalism, pp. 87–90.
David M. Levin, Reason & Evidence in Husserl’s Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1970), pp.
David M. Levin, ‘Husserl’s Notion of Self-Evidence,’ in Pivcevie, E. (ed.) Phenomenology and Philosophical Understanding (New York: Cambridge U. Press, 1975), p. 71.
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1973), p. 158.
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1973), p. 358.
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1973), p. 149.
Max Scheler, ‘Problems of Religion,’ On the Eternal in Man (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 250.
Max Scheler, Selected Philosophical Essays (Evanston: Northwestern U. Press, 1970), p. 115.
Formalism.
In his recent, and admirably balanced, book on Scheler, Eugene Kelly argues that the ranking of value-modalities is an example of the use of Fundierungsordnung by Scheler, even though they doesn’t say so specifically. The Fundierungsordnung represents not a genetic order by a relation of priority of essences. The point is well taken but it runs up against, not just the textual problem, but a justification of the necessity of the order that is not a deduction.
Formalism, pp. 393–394.
Ibid., p. 420.
Ibid., p. 389.
Ibid., p. 292.
Ibid., pp. 292–295.
Ibid., pp. 100–104.
Ibid., pp. 328–343.
Cf. Kelly, op. cit.; Arthur R. Luther, ‘The Articulated Unity of Being in Scheler’s Phenomenology. Basic Drive and Spirit,’ and Parvis Emad, ‘Person, Death and World,’ in Manfred Frings (ed.), Max Scheler 1874–1928, Centennial Essays (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974).
Lovejoy, op. cit., p. 244.
Max Scheler. Man’s Place in Nature (Boston: Beacon, 1961), nn.
Max Scheler. Man’s Place in Nature (Boston: Beacon, 1961), p. 47.
Max Scheler. Man’s Place in Nature (Boston: Beacon, 1961), p. 65.
Max Scheler. Man’s Place in Nature (Boston: Beacon, 1961), p. 68.
Max Scheler. Man’s Place in Nature (Boston: Beacon, 1961), pp. 70–71.
Luther, op. cit., p. 39.
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Sweeney, R.D. (1981). The “Great Chain of Being” in Scheler’s Philosophy. In: Bello, A.A. (eds) The Great Chain of Being and Italian Phenomenology. Analecta Husserliana, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8366-3_7
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