Abstract
A need for an interpretation of the concept of formal logic prompted Husserl’s examination of the problem of language in his Logical Researches. The point of view of Husserl’s examination, as well as the manner in which he interpreted language, are two connected aspects of the same problem. In addition, there are other aspects of Husserl’s inquiry, rich in implications and results and passing beyond the limits of a critical cognitive study of language conceived as constituting an introduction and basis of pure logic.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Logical Researches (Halle, 1922), introduction, par. 1.
R. Gödel, Les sources manuscrites . . . (Geneva, 1957), p. 79.
Firct Respnreh par 27
Ibid., par. 10. Guido Morpurgo Tagliabue, in La semantica e i suoi problemi (Corso di teoretica, 1973–74, Università degli Studi di Trieste), pt. 11, chaps. 17, 20, has some interesting observations to make on Husserl’s distinction between expression and signal, signification and indication.
G. Piana, Linguaggio e conoscenza scientifica (Padova, 1967), p. 27. Jacques Derrida is convinced that at the basis of this concept of the ideality of meaning there is a metaphysical presupposition; “a dogmatic or speculative adherence . . . which would constitute phenomenology in its ‘inside’, in its critical plan, and in the founding value of its suppositions: to be precise, it would constitute it in what will soon be recognized as the source and guarantee of all values, the ‘beginning of beginnings’, that is, the originally offering evidence, the present or the presence of the sense in full original intuition“ (La voix et le phénomène [Paris, 1967] , introduction). The implications stemming from this concept of ideality as an indefmitely repeatable presence have their effect, according to Derrida’s interpretation, in the phenomenological interpretation of language and the relationship between language and logic.
First Research, par. 8.
Ibid., par. 6.
Ibid., par. 7.
Ibid., par. 9.
The term externalisation is not really Husserl’s.
R. Raggiunti, Problemi di significato (Florence, 1973), pp. 171–213.
Cours de linguistique générale (Wiesbaden, 1968), II, 284.
Ibid., chap. 4, par. 1.
Sprog og tanke’, Sprog og Kultur 5 (1936), 24–36.
Formale und traszendentale Logik (Halle, 1929), pp. 17–18.
Krisis (The Hague. 1954). III. 459.
Fifth Research, par. 19.
Op. cit., p. 457.
La Poesia (Bari, 1935), p. 103.
Fourth Research, par. 4.
‘Expression et articulation; une confrontation des points de vue husserlien et saussurien concernant la langue et le discours’, Rev. Phils. Louvain, no. 71 (1973), 72–112.
Erfahrung und Urteil (Hamburg, 1948), p. 88.
Op. cit., p. 234. For a full analysis of the problems dealt with in ‘Erfahrung und Urteil’, see R. Raggiunti, Husserl (Florence, 1967), pp. 259–322.
“If now, the primitive forms having been made clear, we replace every simple term gradually and progressively by a connection of these same forms, applying the primitive, existential law in each case, we obtain new forms whose validity is assured by deduction, which grow together, in free combinations. For example, for the conjunctive connection of propositions: (M and N) and P (M and N) and (P and Q) [(M and N) and P] and Q etc. The same holds good for disjunctive and hypothetical connections of propositions and for other kinds of connection belonging to any category of meaning. It goes without saying that the complications go on in infinitum in a manner that can be controlled by combination, that each form produced remains tied to the same category of meaning, being a sphere of the variability of its terms, and that all the combinations of meaning created within the sphere must of necessity exist, that is, they must show a unitary meaning. It is also evident that the respective existential propositions are obvious deductive consequences of the proposition in its primitive form. It is clear that, instead of applying the same form of connection all the time, we can use different combinations of connective forms in arbitrary variation within what is allowed by law, in order to obtain these constructions. generating thus infinite complex forms“ (par. 13).
Par. 4. Hjelmslev, in his article ‘Sprog og Tanke’, starts off from the opposite thesis, namely, that thought has no moment of autonomy or priority over language, thus denying validity to the statement, taken literally, that language is the expression of thought.
L. Hjelmslev, ‘Langue et parole’, in Cahiers F. de Saussure (1943).
It is doubtful whether such a concept of “form of expression“ is strictly a linguistic concept, or, more plausibly, a semiological concept, defining the meaning of the sign “in general.“
Cf. R. Raggiunti, Problemi di significato, pp. 84–120.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1981 D. Reidel Publishing Company
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Raggiunti, R. (1981). The Language Problem in Husserl’s Phenomenology. In: Bello, A.A. (eds) The Great Chain of Being and Italian Phenomenology. Analecta Husserliana, vol 11. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8366-3_16
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8366-3_16
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-011-7988-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-8366-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive