Abstract
In the preceding chapter we touched briefly on the problem of the two kinds of concepts: concepts that relate to a particular envisaged world, e.g. the actual or empirically accessible world, and concepts that relate to all possible worlds. It would be wrong to think that the competence of semantics can be confined to the first kind only. On the contrary it is to the credit of logical semantics that it has shown ways of semantically analysing the second kind of concepts. This kind of problem area may be described as the semantics of logical concepts, or as logical semantics (L-semantics for short) in the proper sense of the word.
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© 1981 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrect, Holland
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Tondl, L. (1981). The Semantics of Logical Concepts. In: Problems of Semantics. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 66. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8364-9_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8364-9_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-0316-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-8364-9
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