In the foregoing chapter we have been concerned with the world presented to the human percipient in “experientia vaga” without ostensible rationalization, yet congruent with the ‘aptness’ of the percipient’s body to be ‘affected’ by, or to ‘affect,’ what is other, already tacitly rationalized as spatio-temporal and qualitied. This world is perceptually naive, but issues from durationally conative sources that are naive in a more radical sense: what I have styled “the ‘Bergsonian’ inchoation.” We come now to the consideration of some general features of further ostensible rationalizations of the world of experientia vaga, undertaken as a result of well-founded intellectual dissatisfaction with this prima facie world: the worlds of ‘scientific philosophy’ and of phenomenology, resulting from critical analysis and intellectual reconstruction of the so-called ‘given’ world, and aimed at the discovery of the Real by rationalization without metaphysical transcendence. For obvious reasons, of competence no less that of space, the treatment must be general and selective: no truly exhaustive consideration even of all the characteristic worlds of science, based on various special sciences and special assumptions, can here be contemplated. The discussion will, therefore, be limited to certain broad principles commonly involved in such speculations, with a somewhat more direct consideration of one which, coming from a trained philosopher, is less likely to ignore fundamental philosophical difficulties than those which issue from eminent scientists in their reflective moods.
KeywordsObjective Content Empty Time Imaginational World Scientific Philosophy Metaphysical Relativity
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