Questions to be Answered

  • Robert E. McCormick
  • Robert D. Tollison
Part of the Rochester Studies in Economics and Policy Issues book series (RSEP, volume 3)

Abstract

The interest-group theory of government is based upon the premise that a major portion of governmental activity is devoted to the transfer of resources among citizens. Some citizens are net winners in this process and some are net losers. Moreover, the wealth-transfer process is not a simple process in which well-organized and wealthy producers increase their wealth through legislation at the expense of widely dispersed and poorly organized consumers. The more generally correct characterization of the wealth-transfer process does not pit consumers against producers but allows each economic unit to seek transfers from the other units in the economy-polity. Our primary interest in this process will be to analyze the role of the political representative in brokering transfers among the various groups in a society.

Keywords

Expense Allo Monopoly 

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. See Gordon Tullock, “Entry Barriers in Politics,” American Economic Review 55 (May 1967): 458–66.Google Scholar
  2. George J. Stigler (“The Sizes of Legislatures,” Journal of Legal Studies 5 [January 1976]: 17–34)CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  3. George J. Stigler, “Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic Regulation,” Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5 (Autumn 1974 ): 359–65.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

Copyright information

© University of Rochester Center for Research in Government Policy and Business 1981

Authors and Affiliations

  • Robert E. McCormick
    • 1
  • Robert D. Tollison
    • 2
  1. 1.Graduate School of ManagementUniversity of RochesterUSA
  2. 2.Center for Study of Public ChoiceVirginia Polytechnic Institute and State UniversityUSA

Personalised recommendations