Abstract
Dr. Shapiro’s paper implies that the reasons why California law is ineffective in resolving water disputes are much more general than the specific points at issue. Proper incentives, he argues, are as essential as high-quality cost-benefit analyses to efficient public choice. But because bureaucratic incentives and Pareto efficiency are inconsistent, managers who have private stakes in outcomes cannot be trusted to make unbiased decisions.
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© 1981 Martinus Nijhoff Publishing
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Hochman, H.M. (1981). Comments on “California Law and Its Economic Effects on Southern California”. In: Sirkin, G. (eds) Lexeconics. Social Dimensions of Economics, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8141-6_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8141-6_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-009-8143-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-8141-6
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