Abstract
Rent seeking is a comparatively new subject, and its relevance to the law may not be immediately apparent. As a matter of fact, the amount of rent seeking in any society is greatly influenced by the complexity of the laws and the degree to which administrative actions are depended on for government activity. Thus a society that has relatively simple legal codes and nothing in the way of administrative discretion would have very little rent seeking.1 The point of this paper is to discuss in some detail the cost of elaborate law codes and elaborate administrative structures, subjects that normally have been ignored.
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Notes
Anne O. Krueger, “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society,” American Economic Review 64 (June 1974): 291–303.
See Donald L. Huddle, “An Estimate of Import Surplus under a Disequilibrium System,” Public Choice 5 (Fall 1968): 113–20.
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© 1981 Martinus Nijhoff Publishing
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Tullock, G. (1981). Rent Seeking. In: Sirkin, G. (eds) Lexeconics. Social Dimensions of Economics, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8141-6_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8141-6_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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