Abstract
In this chapter, the two-person democratic case with communication will be discussed. The exchange of information serves to integrate the goals of the persons involved. Three cases can be distinguished: harmony, pure conflict, and a mixed case. If harmony exists, there will be no problem, because both parties will choose the alternative with the highest value; the interests run completely parallel. In the case of pure conflict, the interests are diametrically opposed; that is, the interests of the one are to the detriment of the other. A typical example is the two-person zero-sum game. Communication between the parties does not offer any advantage; the solution is given by the maximin strategy. Only in the mixed case, with interests that are neither completely opposed nor parallel, can communication produce a result that is beneficial to both parties, as compared to the case without communication. This is called bargaining or negotiation.
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© 1981 Martinus Nijhoff Publishing
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Hanken, A.F.G., Reuver, H.A. (1981). Two-Person Cooperative Games. In: Social Systems and Learning Systems. Frontiers in Systems Research, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8132-4_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-8132-4_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-009-8134-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-8132-4
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