• T. Chapman
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 159)


The previous chapters have established that the causal relation has a temporal direction. The question of precisely what “direction” means here will be taken up later. The other problems remaining concern this. If strict determinism were true then the claims about causal direction though still correct would have no significance. Secondly it might be thought that the fact that the Special Theory of Relativity makes the distinction between past, present and future relative rendered the above distinctions incoherent on the grounds that the same event might be past relative to one frame of reference and future relative to another. These difficulties are taken up in this and the following chapter.


Modal Logic Logical Truth Causal Determinism Deterministic World Mere Passage 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.


  1. 1.
    On the possibility of interpreting quantum mechanics deterministically through reference to hidden variables see Bas C. van Fraassen, “A Formal Approach to the Philosophy of Science,” in R. G. Colodny, ed., Paradigms and Paradoxes, The Philosophical Challenge of the Quantum Domain, Pittsburgh University Press, 1972, p. 318.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    See F. Waismann, “The Decline and Fall of Causality” in A. C. Crombie, ed., Turning Points in Physics, New York: Harper, 1961, pp. 87–154Google Scholar
  3. R. P. Feynmann, R. B. Leighton and M. Sands, The Feynmann Lectures on Physics, Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1963, Volume I, pp. 38–39.Google Scholar
  4. 3.
    B. Russell, Mysticism and Logic, London: Penguin Books, 1953, p. 188.Google Scholar
  5. Cf. Poincares definition discussed in M. Bunge, Causality. The Place of the Causal Principle in Modern Science, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959, Part I.Google Scholar
  6. R. G. Swinburne, “Physical Determinism” in G. N. A. Vesey, ed., Knowledge and Necessity, London: MacMillan, 1970, pp. 158–168. (The Swinburne reference is from van Fraassen).Google Scholar
  7. 4.
    G. Ryle, “It was to be” in Dilemmas, Cambridge University Press, 1960, pp. 15–35, p. 24.Google Scholar
  8. 5.
    Steven M. Cahn, Fate, Logic and Time, London: Yale University Press, 1967, p. 27.Google Scholar
  9. 6.
    Steven M. Cahn, Fate, Logic and Time, London: Yale University Press, 1967, p. 28.Google Scholar
  10. 7.
    Steven M. Cahn, Fate, Logic and Time, London: Yale University Press, 1967, p. 32.Google Scholar
  11. 8.
    Steven M. Cahn, Fate, Logic and Time, London: Yale University Press, 1967, p. 32.Google Scholar
  12. 9.
    R. Taylor, “Fatalism”, The Philosophical Review, 71 (1962), pp. 56–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  13. 10.
    Raziel Abelson, “Taylor’s Fatal Fallacy”, The Philosophical Review, 72 (1963), pp. 93–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. 14.
    T. Chapman, “Determinism and Omniscience,” Dialogue, vol. IX, 1970, pp. 366–373.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  15. 15.
    Nelson Pike, “Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action,:” The Philosophical Review, January, 1965, 27–46.Google Scholar
  16. 20.
    Reichenbach, The Direction of Time, Los Angeles: University of California, 1971, p. 269. Referred hereafter as DT.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland 1982

Authors and Affiliations

  • T. Chapman
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of GuelphCanada

Personalised recommendations