Abstract
There are a lot of misunderstandings about various methodological and philosophical attitudes usually labeled as ‘conventionalist’. Most of these misunderstandings stem — I think — from, first, a lack of distinction between particular types of conventionalism which leads to the employment of very vague notions like ‘moderate’ or ‘radical’ conventionalism, etc. However, rarely does one distinguish a methodological position according to which some or all statements of empirical sciences are not univocally determined by experience from a philosophical attitude according to which some or all statements of empirical sciences are neither true nor false sentences in a classical sense, but serve as means of classifying and predicting the facts.
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© 1982 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Siemianowski, A. (1982). On Two Kinds of Conventionalism with Respect to Empirical Sciences. In: Krajewski, W. (eds) Polish Essays in the Philosophy of the Natural Sciences. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 68. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7705-1_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7705-1_3
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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