Abstract
The validity of historical generalisations is a vexed issue. In many ways, they are unavoidable yet there is the ever-present danger that what starts out as a heuristic device ends up as a substantive entity so that, instead of it being used to explain phenomena, the reverse takes place with phenomena being understood and utilised only in so far as they fit the generalisation. The terms ‘Enlightenment’ and ‘Romanticism’ have been subject to such vicissitudes.1 With these thoughts in mind the generalisations ‘Enlightenment’ and ‘Romanticism’ will be used but only (it is hoped) as aids.
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References
Cf., inter alia, P. Gay, The Enlightenment: The Rise of Modern Paganism and The Enlightenment: The Science of Freedom; I.O. Wade, The Intellectual Origins of the French Enlightenment; F.L. Ford, ‘The Enlightenment: Towards a Useful Redefinition’ in R.F. Brissenden (ed.), Studies in the Eighteenth Century pp. 17–29: A.O. Lovejoy, ‘The Meaning of Romanticism for the Historian of Ideas’, JHI (1941) 257–278; R. Wellek, ‘The Concept of “Romanticism” in Literary History’, Comparative Literature (1949) 1–23 & 147–172; M. Peckham, ‘Toward a Theory of Romanticism Reconsiderations’, Studies in Romanticism (1961) 1–8.
‘The Activity of being a Historian’ in Rationalism in Politics and other essays, p. 160.
This locution is chosen to avoid falling foul of E. Curtius’ magisterial judgment that “It is a fallacy to talk of the Middle Ages as if they were a uniform age”, ‘The Medieval Bases of Western Thought’ appended to the European Literature in the Latin Middle Ages, p. 589.
Cf. ‘On the Character of a Modern European State’ in his On Human Conduct, pp. 185–326.
Letter to Lorenzo di Pier Francesco de Medici (1502) in S.M. Morison, The European Discovery of America: The Southern Voyages 1492–1616, p. 285.
Principia Philosophia(Everyman Library), p. 167: Oeuvres Philosophiques (Gamier, Paris, 1973), Vol. III, p. 95.
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For example, his conviction (seemingly ‘rationalist’ par excellence) that morality is as capable of demonstration as is mathematics — see Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk. III, Chap. 11, Sect. 16 & IV, 3, 18. Cf. the short discussion of D. Odegaard ‘Locke as an Empiricist’, Philosophy (1965) 185–196.
Cf. his early (1660) Essays on Law of Nature, ed. W. Von Leyden, esp. Lecture IV. See H. Aarsleff, The State of Nature and the Nature of Man’ in John Locke: Problems and Perspectives, ed. J.W. Yolton, pp. 99–136.
Cf. K.P. Fischer, ‘John Locke in the German Enlightenment’, JHI (1915) 431–446. The persistence of Leibniz’ influence (abetted by the publication of his Nouveaux Essais 1765) entails, as one consequence, that the argument here put forward to identify a focal problem for the Enlightenment must be qualified in the case of Germany. For the ‘uniqueness’ of the German Enlightenment see L.W. Beck Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors, p. 245ff., also Chap. 2 infra passim.
Ed. & tr. R. Schwab & W. Rex, p. 83: Ed. F. Picavet, p. 103.
P. Gay, The Enlightenment: Science of Freedom, p. 325.
Cf. A. Lovejoy, who after having declared that ‘uniformitarianism’ was “the first and fundamental principle” of the pervasive philosophy of the Enlightenment, observes that “universality of appeal or of acceptance tends to be taken not only as an effect but as in itself a mark or criterion of truth”, The Parallel of Deism and Classicism’ in his Essays in the History of Ideas, p. 79, 80.
For a pertinent discussion of Montesquieu see the recent study of Sheila M. Mason, Montesquieu’s Idea of Justice who brings out not only Montesquieu’s relationship to his predecessors but also his retention of “the classical notion of an unchanging human nature” within an appreciation of the relativistic and deterministic character of social milieu, p. 146–7.
Cf. E. Vivas, ‘Reiterations and Second Thoughts on Cultural Relativism’ in Relativism and the Study of Man, ed. H. Schoeck & J. Wiggins, p. 45: K. Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Vol. 1, p. 17.
Cf. R. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes (revised edition).
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Ives II, 382: Porteau, p. 245.
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Cf. R. Emerson, ‘Peter Gay and the Heavenly City’, JHI (1967) 383–402, esp. 386–8.
Rousseau provides a clear example of the dismissal of Montaigne’s scepticism in the name of the “clear and universal agreement of all peoples”, for there is “striking unanimity in the judgment of mankind”, Emile (Profession de Foi du Savoyard Vicaire), tr. B. Foxley, p. 252: Oeuvres (Pleiade), Vol. 4, p. 598.
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Cf. J.A. Leith, ‘Peter Gay’s Enlightenment’, Eighteenth Century Studies (1971), 157–171, esp. p. 162. Leith also points out the limitations to the relativism of the philosophes.
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Cf. D.W. Smith, Helvétius: A Study in Persecution.
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Smellie, Vol. III, p. 108: Flourens, Vol. II, p. 9.
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Cf. R.V. Sampson, Progress in the Age of Reason, Chap. IV; S. Goyard-Fabre La Philosophie des Lumières en France, Chap. IV, esp. p. 199.
Cf. esp. A. Vartanian, Diderot and Descartes: A Study of scientific naturalism in the Enlightenment; also, inter alia, C. Frankel, ‘The Faith of Reason’, Chaps. 2, 6 & Conclusion; I.F. Knight, The Geometric Spirit: Abbé Condillac and the French Enlightenment, esp. Epilogue; Emerson, JHI (1967); L.G. Crocker, Nature and Culture: Ethical Thought in the French Enlightenment, Chap. 3.
R.N. Stromberg, ‘History in the Eighteenth Century’, JHI (1951) 295–304 (p. 301).
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Sixth Edit. with author’s last corrections and additions (1785), p. 6. Cf. H.W. Randall, Critical Theory of Lord Kames.
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Nagel, Vol. I, p. 611. Cf. C.J. Beyer, ‘Montesquieu et le relativisme esthetique’, VS (1963) 171–182, who remarks (179) “L’esthetique de Montesquieu, comme tout le reste de sa pensée… [lies] dans son effort de concillier l’absolu et le relatif”.
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Third Edition (1780) p. 219. Cf. M. Grene, ‘Gerard’s Essay on Taste’, MP (1943) 45–58.
In Block, p. 210: Oeuvres, Vol. VIII, p. 309.
Oeuvres, Vol. XIX, p. 272.
Block, p. 539–40: Correspondence, Vol. XXXIII (1974), p. 449.
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Berry, C.J. (1982). The Enlightenment: A Situation. In: Hume, Hegel and Human Nature. Archives Internationales D’Histoire des Idees / International Archives of the History of Ideas, vol 103. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7588-0_2
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