This concluding Chapter will discuss Hegel’s conception of, what was termed in Part II, socio-psychical dynamics, namely, the inter-relations between a theory of self and society. Many commentators have drawn attention to what John Plamenatz called the shift from a preoccupation with rationality in the eighteenth century to one with self-consciousness.1 To appreciate this shift both a long-term and short-term perspective is needed.


Human Nature Biological Survival Twin Theme Term Civil Society Contemporary British Philosophy 
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  1. 1.
    Karl Marx’s Philosophy of Man, p. 67.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Cf. L. Trilling, Sincerity and Authenticity, Chap. 1, itself a synthesis of such ‘trends’.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Penguin Books edition; tr. J. Cohen, p. 17: Oeuvres Complètes (Pléiade Edit.) Vol. 1, p. 5.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    This preoccupation by Rousseau has given rise to numerous ‘psychological’ and ‘psychoanalytical’ studies; the most notable of these is J. Starobinski, J.J. Rousseau: la Transparence et l’Obstacle. Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Confessions, p. 169: Vol. 1, p. 175.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Das Erlebnis und Dichtung, 14th edit., p. 152–3.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    For example, R. Schacht (Alienation) deals with Hegel, Marx and their successors. I. Meszaros (Marx’s Theory of Alienation, Chap. 1) and Plamenatz do draw attention to Rousseau’s importance, and Meszaros also refers to Diderot, whose Neveu de Rameu (popularised in Germany by Goethe), as Trilling discusses, had deep impact on Hegel’s depiction of der sich entfremdete Geist in the Phänomenologie. M. Berman (The Politics of Authenticity) provides a general interpretation of Rousseau’s thought, in which Rousseau’s central concern is held to be with a world in which men were alienated not only from themselves but from each other; a concern which is said by Berman to prefigure Marxism in many way.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    The debt that Hegel owes to Schiller’s Briefe über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menchen (1794/5), which Hegel declared to be “a masterpiece” on its appearance (Briefe, ed. J. Hoffmeister, Vol. I, p. 25 [to Schelling, 16 April 1795]), is often pointed out in this regard. More generally, R. Plant (Hegel) sees as the key to the identity of Hegel’s thought the twin themes of personal fragmentation and social division (p. 28) and the role Hegel allots to philosophy to harmonise these fissures (p. 88).Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    The Moral Law (Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten), ed. & tr. H. J. Paton, p. 80; Werke (Akad. Edit.) Vol. IV, p. 412.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    The link between Kant and Rousseau is explored in several writings of E. Cassirer but as a useful corrective to an overly Kantian reading of Rousseau see R. Derathé, Le Rationalisme de J.J. Rousseau & J. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory, Chap. 2.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    All references are to the edition of the Wissenschaftlehre with First and Second Introductions, ed. & tr. P. Heath & J. Lachs and to Werke, ed. I. Fichte (1845): thus p. 10: Vol. 1, p. 428.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Wissenschaftlehre, p. 71: Vol. 1, p. 501.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Wissenschaftlehre, p. 50: Vol. 1, p. 477. Fichte is concerned not so much to refute Kant as to render him consistent. Thus he quotes Kant’s treatment of the ‘I think’ as a unity of apperception and holds that implicity within Kant’s treatment is the concept of the pure self exactly as put forward by Fichte himself; pp. 48–50; Vol. 1, pp. 475–6.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Wissenschaftlehre, p. 77: Vol. 1, p. 462.Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    Wissenschaftlehre, p. 129: Vol. 1, p. 134.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Cf. X. Léon, Fichte et son temps, Vol. 1, p. 450 & H. Korff, Goethe und der Goethezeit, Vol. 3, p. 258.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    Léon, Fichte, Vol. 1, p. 459, 453.Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    G. Lukacs, Goethe and his Age, p. 175ff.Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    A. Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, 2nd Edit., p. 11.Google Scholar
  20. 20.
    Kojève, Introduction, p. 14, 169.Google Scholar
  21. 21.
    Leviathan (1651) (Everyman Edit.) p. 64.Google Scholar
  22. 22.
    Kojève, Introduction, p. 172. But Kojève’s further claim that this interaction ceases with Napoleon and the creation by him of the universal state is to stretch this warrant unacceptably. For pertinent comment see G.A. Kelly, ‘Notes on Hegel’s “Lordship and Bondageaa’“, in Hegel: A collection of critical essays, ed. A. Maclntyre, pp. 189–218.Google Scholar
  23. 23.
    Grundlage des Naturrechts nach Principien der Wissenschaftlehre, tr. A.E. Kroeger, p. 163: Werke Vol. III, p. 114.Google Scholar
  24. 24.
    Cf. P.G. Stillman, ‘Hegel’s critique of Liberal Theories of Rights’, APSR (1974) 1086–92.Google Scholar
  25. 25.
    K. Olivecrona notes that Locke’s term ‘property’ or ‘propriety’ is a translation of Grotius’ ‘suum’. ‘Appropriation in the State of Nature: Locke on the Origin of Property’, JHI (1974) 218.Google Scholar
  26. 26.
    See also First Treatise, para. 92 — “Property, whose original is from the right a man has to use any of the inferior creatures for the subsistence and comfort of his life, is for the benefit and sole advantage of the proprietor, so that he may even destroy the thing that he has property in by use of it, where need requires”.Google Scholar
  27. 27.
    Theory of Legislation, ed. R. Hildreth, p. 112.Google Scholar
  28. 28.
    J.S. Mill puts this unequivocally, “property is only a means to an end, not an end in itself”, Principles of Political Economy, Bk. II, Chap. 2, para. 4 (Pelican edit.) p. 376.Google Scholar
  29. 29.
    Bentham, Theory of Legislation, p. 115.Google Scholar
  30. 30.
    Theory of Legislation, p. 111–2.Google Scholar
  31. 31.
    This distinction between possession and property is made by Hegel in his early writings — property is a universal and appertains to Spirit not Nature (JR II, 206). Fichte had also distinguished property and possession in terms of recognition — Grundlage, p. 182: Vol. III, p. 130.Google Scholar
  32. 32.
    Cf. W.H. Walsh, The Constancy of Human Nature’, in Contemporary British Philosophy, ed. H.D. Lewis, p. 278.Google Scholar

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© Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1982

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  • Christopher J. Berry

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