Abstract
Consider the legislative process leading to school finance reform. Various coalitions of legislators have the potential to pass reform measures on which their members agree. The outcomes achievable by a coalition are constrained by the technology of school operation and by social and legal constraints on redistribution between coalition members. Subject to these constraints, the members of a potential coalition will bargain over the terms of reform. A coalition will fail if its members are unable to come to an agreement, or some members abandon the coalition to join a second which offers preferred outcomes.
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© 1981 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague
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McFadden, D. (1981). Comments on R. P. Inman. In: Bowman, M.J. (eds) Collective Choice in Education. Studies in Public Choice. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7398-5_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7398-5_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-009-7400-5
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-7398-5
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