Abstract
Plurality voting—the system of voting in which each individual casts a ballot for one alternative and the alternative with the most votes wins—is perhaps the most obviously manipulable of all voting procedures. Political observers have long noted that when most of the votes will be split between two candidates, sup-porters of minor candidates are torn between “wasting” their vote on an obvious loser while expressing their first preference and voting for their second choice but perhaps making a difference in the outcome. The collection of preference order data for representative samples now makes strategic voting possible even in large electorates, such as in state and national elections.
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© 1982 Kluwer · Nijhoff Publishing
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Niemi, R.G., Frank, A.Q. (1982). Sophisticated Voting under the Plurality Procedure. In: Ordeshook, P.C., Shepsle, K.A. (eds) Political Equilibrium. Studies in Public Choice, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7380-0_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7380-0_11
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-009-7382-4
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-7380-0
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