Oligopoly Theory in a Rivalrous Consonance Framework: The Case for Lessened Generality
It is the thesis of this brief paper that the terrain of economic theory is littered with fallen angels and that the rate of tumbling has become torrential in the last thirty years. The theorist, encumbered by an increasingly complex mathematical apparatus that presses him to seek unambiguous results at all costs in terms of reality, searches for hypotheses that permit him to evaluate deduced expressions in qualitative dimensions. The methodology itself places a great premium on crisp results and universal truths purchased at the expense of hypothesizing pure competition, concave or convex objective functions, single-objective decision making, complete, zero-sum, loggerheads rivalry, or, at the other extreme, joint-profit maximization and a host of other convenient if distorting instrumental postulates.
KeywordsTransportation Assure Expense Nash Rium
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