Abstract
There remains an important sphere of possible legal interference not clearly affected by the foregoing principles. When the law intervenes to prevent harm to oneself or others, the intervention is justified, if at all, because it serves to protect a person in a legitimate way. However, sometimes actions pose no threat to persons sufficient to warrant intervention. What persons do with things other than persons is an example. May coercive law ever be used to interfere with what persons do with things (where there is no direct threat to persons)?
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© 1983 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Hodson, J.D. (1983). The Principle of Community. In: The Ethics of Legal Coercion. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 26. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7257-5_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7257-5_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-277-1843-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-7257-5
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