Abstract
Frequently the reduction of scientific theories is treated as a linguistic issue: One theory is said to be reduced to another if the objects referred to by the former are identified with entities in the domain of the latter, and the laws of the former are derived from the laws of the latter (plus whatever connecting principles, correspondence rules, or bridge laws are needed to link the vocabularies of the two theories). The objects of the reduced theory are thus shown to be nothing but objects (or combinations of objects) recognized by the reducing theory, and the concepts of the reduced theory are shown to be theoretically superfluous. The resulting ontological and conceptual economies may reasonably be construed semantically, for they demonstrate that the language of science requires fewer primitive terms than had been previously supposed. Positions taken by Quine and Goodman suggest, however, that evidential and linguistic arguments are in principle too weak to secure theoretical reduction.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
W. V. Quine, ‘Ontological Relativity,’ in Ontological Relativity and Other Essays ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1969 ), p. 32.
Donald Davidson, ‘Mental Events’ in Experience and Theory,Lawrence Foster and J. W. Swanson (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1970), p. 93. Page numbers in parentheses throughout my paper refer to this article.
Wilfrid Sellars, ‘The Language of Theories,’ in Science, Perception, and Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 121.(1980), pp. 504–511.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1984 D. Reidel Publishing Company
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Elgin, C.Z. (1984). Theory Reduction: A Question of Fact or a Question of Value?. In: Cohen, R.S., Wartofsky, M.W. (eds) Physical Sciences and History of Physics. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 82. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7178-3_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7178-3_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-009-7180-6
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-7178-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive