Beyond Intuitionism — A Step

Abstract

If the argument of the preceding chapter is accepted, then it appears that there can be no single fundamental practical principle, nor can there be a principle for the ordering of kinds of moral considerations. John Rawls has characterized as ‘intuitionistic’ those ethical theories which hold that there are a number of possibly conflicting ‘first’ principles, with no higher-level principle to determine priorities among them: ‘we are to strike a balance by intuition’.¹Even disregarding those views which involve moral skepticism and nihilism, it is by no means clear that the sole alternative to an appeal to exceptionless principles need be an appeal to unaided intuition; nor amongst those who are paradigmatically intuitionists, who emphasize the role of some sort of immediate apprehension of the moral quality of acts, need their intuitionism be based on the recognition of a conflict of principles. I shall say more on each of these points below.