Practical Reasoning, Action, and Weakness of Will

Abstract

Before turning to a discussion of the venerable problem of freedom and responsibility, I should say a few words about my use of the expression ‘practical reasoning’. There are judgments expressible in sentences of the form ’All things considered, [person or agent] P ought (not) to perform (have performed, be performing) [action] A’. Any such judgment I shall call a practical judgment. On this usage, it is a practical judgment, e. g., that, all things considered, Socrates ought to have escaped from jail instead of remaining and being executed, even though in an obvious sense — that, roughly, of having applicability to our everyday affairs — it is clearly not a practical judgment. Now by ’practical reasoning’, I mean simply the presentation and weighing of reasons in support of or in opposition to a practical judgment. So construed, practical reasoning, in a given case, at least, need not be practical in the Aristotelian sense of being directed to practice: one may have a theoretical curiosity in determining whether a given action was, overall, a suitable one, whether, e. g., Socrates did the right thing in refusing the opportunity to escape. Many philosophers suggest that one’s interest in practical reasoning about historical cases lies in its possible applicability to relevantly similar future cases.

“The aim [of ethical inquiry] is, not practice, but propositions about practice; and propositions about practice are not themselves practical, any more than propositions about gases are gaseous.”

— Bertrand Russell, “The Elements of Ethics”

“Perhaps acrasia is one of the best examples of a pseudo-problem in philosophical literature” — John Lemmon, “Moral Dilemmas”