“With God All is Permitted”

Abstract

In this final chapter, I shall discuss the view that morality must be or may be based on divine command or divine approval, the view, i. e., that what one ought (not) to do depends solely on what God wills. I shall discuss this view in part because of its historical practical importance, but principally because it represents a kind of position in terms of which there is but a single right-making consideration. I have already made clear my skepticism about the tenability of any such single-principle views. Part of my argument is designed to show the unacceptability of any view which holds that ‘oughtness’ is defined in terms of or otherwise constituted by the subjective reaction (e. g., approval) of any observer, divine or human, actual or ideal.

“By the command of God, death can be inflicted on any man, guilty or innocent, without any injustice whatever.”

— Aquinas, Treatise on Law

“Without God All is Permitted.”

— Dostoevsky, The Brothers Karamozov