Abstract
The classic body-soul problem formulates unaltered a key philosophical problem. The experience of being a citizen of two worlds, existing in the corporeal world while at the same time living a life of the mind (“Leben des Geistes”),1 persistently disturbs our self-understanding. Who is man, what relation has his thinking to corporeality? Is “soul” merely an archaic name for “mind,” or does the soul possess a reality of its own? Can the assumption of an immaterial world be reconciled with scientific, technical reality? Can present-day brain research offer us solutions to these questions2 whereby man proves himself to be an electrochemically controlled mechanism? Or is psychology the science which has to probe and examine our emotional and cognitive faculties? These are questions which affect our existence. But scientists do not determine what science means;3 and whether body, soul, mind are even accessible to scientific investigation becomes ever more questionable. The question of man’s being remains in its anthropological constraint without significant answer.
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References
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Schirmacher, W. (1983). Monism in Spinoza’s and Husserl’s Thought. In: Tymieniecka, AT. (eds) Soul and Body in Husserlian Phenomenology. Analecta Husserliana, vol 16. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7032-8_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-7032-8_29
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