Abstract
The picture Professor Weingartner gives of Leibniz seems to me clear in the Leibnizean sense of that term — it is certainly Leibniz whom one picks out by means of it. His picture of Descartes, however, I find rather less clear, so much so that with it I hardly recognize the philosopher whom I know as Descartes. The problem as I see it is that Weingartner gives us essentially one picture for both Leibniz and Descartes, and my primary aim here will be to indicate why this is problematic. My thesis will be that Leibniz’s own appreciation of the differences between his own philosophy and Descartes’ as significant, is correct.
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Notes
Gallimard, Paris, 1960.
Ibid. p. 529.
G. W. L Samtliche, II, 1, p. 247; Gerhardt I, 368n.
Beiaval, p. 11 fn. 3.
Ibid.,p. 532.
AT I, 149-50.
AT VII,431;HR II, 248.
AT IV, 118-19.
V. ‘The Creation of the Eternal Truths in Descartes’s System’, in Willis Doney (ed.), Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays, Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1967, pp. 192–208.
Leibniz: Basic Writings, Trans., George R. Montgomery, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois, 1968, pp. 4–5.
Frankfurt’s actual view on the creation of the eternal verities is that Descartes was led to it because for him there is no difference between God’s will and His understanding and thus the scholastic view above, the only alternative to viewing the verities as independent of God, is not open to him. Harry Frankfurt: ‘Descartes on The Creation of The Eternal Truths’, The Philosophical Review LXXXVI,1 (1977), 36–57. I do not find convincing his very brief attempt (n. 7, p. 41) to explain why Descartes denied any difference between divine will and understanding, which denial can be regarded as a metaphorical assertion of the creation doctrine. On the other hand, his discussion provides good evidence for his well-known thesis on the Cartesian distinction between truth and rational assertibility.
Harry G. Frankfurt; ‘Descartes’ Validation of Reason’, Willis Doney, op. cit. p. 221.
27 May, 1638;AT II, 138.
Re: Principles I, 43. Monadology And Other Philosophical Essays, Trans., P. & A. M. Schrecker, Bobbs Merrill, Indianapolis, 1965, p. 35.
Re: Principles I, 1. Ibid., p. 22.
Regulae III, HR I, 8.
Hiram Caton: ‘Will and Reason in Descartes’ Theory of Error’, Journal of Philosophy 72 (27 February, 1975) 4.
HR I, 270.
Anthony Kenny:’ The Cartesian Grcle And The Eternal Truths’, Journal of Philosophy LXVII (1970), 698.
Loc. cit., p. 33.
Ibid.
L. Couturat, Opuscules, p. 18, cited by Nicholas Rescher, The Philosophy of Leibniz, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1967, p. 43.
V. P. [ ].
HR I, 9.
Cf: Weingartner [ ].
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© 1983 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Lennon, T.M. (1983). The Leibnizean Picture of Descartes. In: Shea, W.R. (eds) Nature Mathematized. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6957-5_9
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