Abstract
In this paper I will follow two related trends. First, I will take issue with Weingartner’s general and unique scheme for interpreting such different doctrines of scientific rationality as Descartes’s and Leibniz’s In a second move, of a more special kind, I will analyze Leibniz’s reflections on the logic of scientific hypotheses during the timespan between Hypothesis physica nova (1671) and the formulation of the original principles of his dynamics(1678).1
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Notes
Cf. Yvon Beiaval, “Premières Animadversions sur les ‘Principes’ de Descartes”, Etudes leibniziennes, Gallimard, Paris, 1976, p. 58 n. 8.
P. VIII, 2 verso, in Louis Couturat, La logique de Leibniz, (1901), Olms, Hildesheim, 1969, p. 199.
Cf. Couturat, op cit., p. 206: “Ainsi le fondement essentiel de la déduction est le principe suprême et unique de la Logique, et non pas le principe du syllogisme (le Dictum de omni et nullo d’ Aristote), car celui-ci n’est pas, comme on le croit souvent, un axiome identique, mais un théorème qui se démontre au moyen du principe prédédent.”
L. J. Beck, The Method of Descartes. A Study of the Regulae, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1952, pp. 78–79.
Die Philosophischen Schiften, Gerhardt, (ed.) VII, p. 300.
Ibid., VII, pp. 295-296.
Ibid., IV, p. 438.
As quoted in Weingartner’s text.
Yvon Belaval, Leibniz critique de Descartes, Gallimard, Paris, 1960, pp. 410–411.
Cf. Conring an Leibniz, 16/26 Feb., 1671, P. I, pp. 171-172.
From the classification of ideas, one could probably infer what the minimal conditions are for ascertaining the rational capacity of scientific concepts.
P. I, p. 174.
Cf. P. I, p. 174, and especially, p. 195 (Leibniz an Conring, 19 March, 1678).
P. I, p. 174.
Cf. P. I, p. 186.
P. I, p. 202.
P.I, p. 334.
P. I, p. 336.
P. I, p. 336.
Yvon Belaval, op. cit.,“Premières Animadversions sur les ‘Principes’ de Descartes”, pp. 57-85.
Leibniz an Malebranche, 22 June, 1679, P. I, p. 332.
Leibniz an Foucher, P. I, p. 372.
Cf. P. I, p. 381: “En matière de connaissances humaines il faut tâcher d’avancer, et quand même ce ne serait qu’en établissant beaucoup de choses sur quelque peu de suppositions, cela ne laisserait pas d’être utile, car au moins nous saurons qu’il ne nous reste qu’à prouver ce peu de suppositions pour parvenir à une pleine démonstration, et en attendant, nous aurons au moins des vérités hypothétiques, et nous sortirons de la confusion des disputes. C’est la méthode des Géomètres…”
Leibniz an Conring, 3 Jan., 1678, P. I, p. 186.
Conring an Leibniz, 26 Feb., 1678, P. I, pp. 190-191.
Leibniz an Conring, 19 March, 1678, P. I, p. 194.
Ibid., p. 194.
Ibid., pp. 194-195.
Principia,§ 206, A. T, VIII-1, pp. 328-329.
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© 1983 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
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Duchesneau, F. (1983). The “More Geometrico” Pattern in Hypotheses from Descartes to Leibniz. In: Shea, W.R. (eds) Nature Mathematized. The University of Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science, vol 20. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6957-5_8
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