Abstract
What our study of the Logical Investigations suggests is that while the broad outlines of Dreyfus’ critique are accurate, Husserl’s position is much more variegated and complex than what he suggests. On the one hand, Husserl clearly distinguishes between the meaning which is intended or bestowed by the act and the meaning which fulfills the intention. When this relationship is discussed, there is no conflation. On the other hand, the Investigations characterizes perceptual fulfillment as a noetic modification of a signifying act, and thus, its sense constituent is derived from the latter. Meaningl and meaningp are distinguishable but not distinct. Because the early Husserl does not have a clear conception of the noematic side of the act, the conflation of the two tends to prevail. The result of this is that Husserl describes the perceptual act according to the model of the speech-act. It finds its source, as we will attempt to show, in the equating of signifying and perceptual intending. We will also suggest, however, that there are several points where Husserl presses toward a proper characterization of perceptual intending.
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© 1983 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague
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Welton, D. (1983). The First Elaboration: A Noetics of Perception. In: The Origins of Meaning. Phaenomenologica, vol 88. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6778-6_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6778-6_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-009-6780-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-6778-6
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