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The Paradox of Naming

  • W. Lycan
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 178)

Abstract

There is overwhelming evidence that proper names must have senses or connotations that somehow contain contingent information about their referents. There is also overwhelming evidence that proper names cannot possibly have such senses or connotations. That is the paradox of naming.

Keywords

Propositional Attitude Downward Causation Contingent Property Rigid Designator Belief Operator 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1985

Authors and Affiliations

  • W. Lycan

There are no affiliations available

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