Psychologism in Indian Logical Theory
The Indian logical theories, the Nyāya in particular, offer interesting models in the light of which one may hopefully throw new light on some of the persistent problems in philosophy of logic, which are generally discussed within the framework of Western thinking. The new possibilities that they open up could be instructive, at least by way of extending the boundaries of our available models, and we may be able, as a consequence, to see some of the limitations under which discussions in philosophy of logic are carried out. I want to discuss here one such problem: the issue about psychologism in logic.
KeywordsCausal Condition Temporal Position Epistemic Logic Abstract Entity Perceptual Cognition
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