Abstract
It need hardly be reminded that the notion of paradigm, which occupies a central place as an opinion-divider in today’s discussions in philosophy and sociology of science, owes most of its present status to the work of Thomas S. Kuhn. As is usual with those scholarly works that more or less drastically challenge the received views and assumptions in a particular intellectual field, Kuhn’s work also has occasioned many different sorts of reactions. In the course of the study reported in this paper, we have gained the impression that the most controversial points in Kuhn’s theory, for instance the perplexing contrast between periods of “normal science”, i. e. paradigm-boundness, and “revolution”, i. e. paradigm change, begin to make sense as soon as Kuhn’s paradigm concept is taken as an operative principle of examining the development of a particular scientific field or discipline. In fact, Kuhn himself has patiently laid stress on this point by underlining that paradigms or the like can be discerned only amongst certain specialties in sciences and not “allembracingly” as spanning over whole scientific branches or disciplines. For the analysis of the development of legal science, this observation is extremely important. If it is overlooked, Kuhn’s research program remains without its essential historical and sociological dimension. This is also why we have chosen to speak about paradigms in legal dogmatics, not about paradigms of legal research or legal dogmatics. This is an important point to notice.
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Aarnio, A. (1984). Paradigms in Legal Dogmatics. In: Peczenik, A., Lindahl, L., Roermund, B.V. (eds) Theory of Legal Science. Synthese Library, vol 176. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6481-5_4
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