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Goal Reasons in Common Law Cases — are They Predictive?

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Theory of Legal Science

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 176))

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Abstract

The two most important kinds of reasons to be found in judicial opinions in common law cases are authority reasons and substantive reasons. Common law authority reasons consist primarily of appeals to the binding force of previously decided cases — to precedent. Such authority reasons derive their justif icatory force from two main sources: (1) the substantive reasons behind the precedent itself, and (2) the applicability of further substantive reasons that support the doctrine of binding precedent.

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© 1984 D. Reidel Publishing Company

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Summers, R.S. (1984). Goal Reasons in Common Law Cases — are They Predictive?. In: Peczenik, A., Lindahl, L., Roermund, B.V. (eds) Theory of Legal Science. Synthese Library, vol 176. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6481-5_27

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6481-5_27

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-009-6483-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-6481-5

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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