Abstract
When lawyers disagree over the right answer to a question of interpretation of the body of cases and statutes in a particular domain, what exactly is their disagreement about? Are the rival propositions they advance to be evaluated as true or false? If so, in what sense? If not then how is the evaluation to proceed?
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Notes
cf. D.N.MacCormick, ‘Coherence in Legal justification’ (This Volume, p. and R.M.Dworkin ‘No Right Answer?’ in Law, Morality and Society eds. P.M.S. Hacker and J.Raz (Oxford: 1977) p.78ff.
E.Nagel, The Structure of Science (London: 1961)p.91–100.
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© 1984 D. Reidel Publishing Company
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Leader, S.L. (1984). Monism, Pluralism, Relativism, and Right Answers in the Law. In: Peczenik, A., Lindahl, L., Roermund, B.V. (eds) Theory of Legal Science. Synthese Library, vol 176. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6481-5_21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6481-5_21
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