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Objectivity and Rationality in Lawyer’s Reasoning

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Book cover Theory of Legal Science

Part of the book series: Synthese Library ((SYLI,volume 176))

Abstract

Objectivity and rationality belong to the most important and universally postulated virtues of lawyers’ reasoning. But what does it mean that legal practice and jurisprudence aim at objectivity and rationality? Of course — everybody has some vague idea about objectivity and reasonableness, but it is one of the philosopher’s tasks to clarify these terms and to analyse the methodological implications of these postulates.

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Notes

  1. Rawls, J.: 1971, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, London, Oxford, New York;cf. also: Weinberger, O: 1977, ‘Begründung oder Illusion’, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 31, pp.234–251, reprinted in: Weinberger, O.: 1979, Logische Analysen in der Jurisprudenz, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, pp. 195–216.

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  2. Cf. Weinberger, O.: 1983, Studien zur formalfinalistischen Handlungstheorie, Verlag Peter Lang, Frankfurt/M., Bern, New York, p. 3f.

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  3. Cf. Lessing, G.E.: 1779, Nathan der Weise.

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  4. In der Logik gibt es keine Moral, Carnap, R.: 1968 (1934), Logische Syntax der Sprache, 2. Ed., p.45.

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  5. Schreier, F.: 1926, ‘Über die Lehre vom “Möglichen Recht”’, Logos, XV, pp. 364–370.

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  6. Aarno, A.: 1977, On Legal Reasoning, Annales Universitatis Turkuensis, 144, Loisnaa.

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  7. Kotarbinski, T.: 1965, Praxiology. An Introduction to the Sciences of Effective Action, Pergamon Press, Oxford.

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  8. Cf. Alexy, R.: 1978, Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt/M.

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  9. MacCormick, D. N.: 1984, ‘Coherence in Legal Justification’, in this volume.

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  10. Ch.Weinberger, O.Weinberger: 1979, Logik, Semantik, Hermeneutik, München, p.109ff., p.183.

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© 1984 D. Reidel Publishing Company

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Weinberger, O. (1984). Objectivity and Rationality in Lawyer’s Reasoning. In: Peczenik, A., Lindahl, L., Roermund, B.V. (eds) Theory of Legal Science. Synthese Library, vol 176. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6481-5_18

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6481-5_18

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-009-6483-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-6481-5

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