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RCBA and the Assumption of Partial Quantification

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Science Policy, Ethics, and Economic Methodology

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Abstract

Until this century, there was usually great harmony between the predominant ethics of the culture and the underlying assumptions of its writers on economics. Adam Smith mirrored the atmosphere of 18th-century egoism, for example, while Bentham epitomized the climate of 19th-century utilitarian reform. In this century, however, there have been few parallels between ethics and economics.1 Perhaps this is because economics has in part been assimilated to ‘positive science’ in the Comptean sense, while most of the questions of ethics arise explicitly only in a nonpositivist framework.

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Notes

  1. A. L. Macfie, ‘Welfare in Economic Theory’, The Philosophical Quarterly 3 (10), (January 1953), 59.

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  2. S. Koreisha and R. Stobaugh, ‘Appendix’, in Energy Fugure (ed. by R. Stobaugh and D. Yergin), Random House, New York, 1979, p. 234; hereafter cited as: Appendix, in EF.

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  3. See, for example, E.C. Pasour, ‘Benevolence and the Market’, Modern Age 24 (2), (Spring 1980), 168. TA’s and EIA’s are widely held to be unbiased, outside the realm of policy or value judgments, nonpartisan, and objective (Congress, US Office of Technology Assessment, Annual Report to the Congress for 1977, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1977, p. 4; hereafter cited as: Congress, OTA, AR 1977.

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  4. As was mentioned earlier, in Chapters One and Two, all US regulatory agencies now base their assessments in part on RCBA, and the 1979 NEPA has been interpreted to require a risk-cost-benefit assessment. See Peter Self, Econocrats and the Policy Process, Macmillan, London, 1975, p. ix; hereafter cited as: Self, PPCBA.

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  5. See also L. J. Carter, ‘Dispute over Cancer Risk Quantification’, Science 203 (4387), (March 30, 1979), 1324–1325; hereafter cited as: Carter, Dispute.

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  6. See also C. Starr and C. Whipple, ‘Risks of Risk Decisions’, Science 208 (4448), (June 6, 1980), 1118; hereafter cited as Starr and Whipple, Risks.

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  7. Finally, see Joel Yellin, ‘Judicial Review and Nuclear Power’, George Washington Law Review 45 (5), (August 1977), and J. R. Luke, ‘Environmental Impact Assessment for Water Resource Projects’, George Washington Law Review 45 (5), (August 1977), 1106–1107; hereafter cited as: Luke, EIA.

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  8. See Koreisha and Stobaugh, Appendix, p. 11.

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  9. Self, PPCBA, p.ix.

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  10. Lester Lave, ‘Public Perception of Risk’, in Mitre Corporation, Symposium/Workshop... Risk Assessment and Governmental Decision Making, The Mitre Corporation, McLean, Virginia, 1979, p. 577; hereafter cited as: Lave, Public, and Mitre Corporation.

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  11. S. Gage, ‘Risk Assessment in Governmental Decision Making’, in Mitre Corporation (note 7), pp. 11–13. See Sheldon Samuels, ‘Panel on Accident Risk Assessment’, in Mitre Corporation (note 7), p. 391.

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  12. Quoted by Alexander Rosenberg, Microeconomic Laws: A Philosophical Analysis, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1976, p. 155.

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  13. See also N. Georgescu-Roegen, Analytical Economics, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1966, p. 186, who makes the same point; hereafter cited as: Georgescu-Roegen, AE.

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  14. See E. J. Mishan, Economics for Social Decisions, Praeger, New York, 1972, pp. 11–14; hereafter cited as: Mishan, ESD.

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  15. For confirmation of the fact that welfare economists generally do not quantify nonmarket costs and benefits, see R. M. Hare, ‘Contrasting Methods of Environmental Planning’, in K. E. Goodpaster and K. M. Sayre (eds.), Ethics and the Problems of the 21st Century, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1979, pp. 64–68 (hereafter cited as: Hare, Methods, and Goodpaster and Sayre, Ethics)

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  16. E. J. Mishan, Welfare Economics, Random House, New York, 1969, p. 86

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  17. hereafter cited as: WE. See also M. W. Jones-Lee, The Value of Life: An Economic Analysis, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1976, pp. 21–28 (hereafter cited as: Value)

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  18. and L. H. Mayo, ‘The Management of Technology Assessment’, in R. G. Kasper (ed.), Technology Assessment: Understanding the Social Consequences of Technological Applications, Praeger, New York, 1972, p. 78 (hereafter cited as: Kasper, TA). Employment of this principle of nonqualification raises an interesting epistemological issue. (1) Can welfare economists be said not to be using the notions of Pare to Optimum and ‘compensating variation,’ since they do not include all cost-benefit parameters in their calculations? (2) Or, on the other hand, may they be said to employ modified versions of these two concepts, since they are not practically usable as defined in economic theory? Whether either (1) or (2), or neither, is the case will not substantially affect the discussion in this section. Although most economists would probably agree with (2), the point of examining the methodological principle here (regarding nonqualification of some parameters) is to assess its desirability and not to determine its status as Pareto-based or not.

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  19. H. P. Green, ‘Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessment and the Law’, George Washington Law Review 45, (5), (August 1977), 904–905; hereafter cited as: Green, CRBA. See also Self, PPCBA, pp. 78–79.

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  20. E. Mishan, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Praeger, New York, 1976, pp. 160–161

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  21. hereafter cited as: Mishan, CBA. See also Mishan, ESD p. 21, and E. Rotwein, ‘Mathematical Economies’, in S. R. Krupp (ed.), The Structure of Economic Science, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1966, p. 102; hereafter cited as: Rotwein, ME, and Krupp, SES.

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  22. Mishan, CBA, pp. 160–161. The economists’ practice of not quantifying nonmarket parameters is also generally adhered to by government regulators. According to one observer, “nobody in Washington puts a dollar value on lives, pain, or injuries.” (Fred Hapgood, ‘Risk-Benefit Analysis’, The Atlantic 243 (1), (January 1979), 36.

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  23. T. C. Means, ‘The Concorde Calculus’, George Washington Law Review 45 (5), (August 1977), 1044.

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  24. Luke, EIA (note 5), p. 1108.

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  25. Plato, Philebus, tr. with notes by J. C. B. Gosling, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975, pp.7, 9(16c-17b, 18a-18c).

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  26. Georgescu-Roegen, AE, (note 9), p. 171.

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  27. S. S. Stevens, ‘Measurement, Psychophysics, and Utility’, in C. W. Churchman and P. Ratoosh (ed.), Measurement: Definitions and Theories, John Wiley, New York, 1959, p. 36; hereafter cited as: Stevens, Measurement, and Churchman and Ratoosh, Measurement.

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  28. Although I will not argue this broader point here, my claim is that rational assessment procedures require an unambiguous means of comparing policy alternatives. Unless various options can be expressed in terms of a ‘common denominator’ (e.g., ordering, preference-ranking, rating, quantification), one not necessarily based on a ‘numerical’ or monetary system, then there is little assurance that technology assessment will be as rational or as objective as might be possible. For a discussion of analytical, versus intuitive, modes of risk assessment, see C. Starr and C. Whipple, Risks (note 4), pp. 1114–1119.

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  29. L. J. Carter, ‘Dispute over Cancer Risk Quantification’, Science 203 (4387), (March 30, 1979), 1324–1325.

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  30. This argument is given in L. H. Mayo, “The Management of Technology Assessment’, in Kasper, TA (note 11), p. 78.

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  31. F. A. Hayek, ‘The New Confusion About “Planning”’, in E. F. Paul and P. A. Russo (eds.), Public Policy, Chatham House, Chatham, New Jersey, 1982, p. 307.

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  32. J. A. Hobson, Confessions of an Economic Heretic, Harvester Press, Sussex, England, 1976, pp. 39–40

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  33. hereafter cited as: Confessions. See also B. M. Anderson, Social Value: A Study in Economic Theory Critical and Constructive, A. M. Kelly, New York, 1966, pp. 24–26, 31, 162

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  34. hereafter cited as: Social Value. See K. E. Boulding, ‘The Basis of Value Judgments in Economies’, in Sidney Hook (ed.), Human Values and Economic Policy, New York University Press, New York, 1967, pp. 85–88; hereafter cited as: Hook, HV and EP, and Boulding, ‘Basis’.

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  35. See K. E. Boulding, ‘Basis’, in Hook, HV and EP, pp. 67–68. Oskar Morgenstern, On the Accuracy of Economic Observations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N. J. 1963, p. 19 (hereafter cited as: Accuracy), ties the “errors of economic statistics”, such as price, in part to the fact of the prevalence of monopolies. In an economy characterized by monopoly, he says, statistics regarding price are not trustwothy because of “secret rebates granted to different customers”. Moreover, he claims, “sales prices constitute some of the most closely guarded secrets in many businesses”. For both these reasons it is likely not only that price ≠ value, but also that actual price ≠ official market price.

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  36. R. C. Dorf, Technology, Society, and Man, Boyd and Fraser, San Francisco, 1974, pp. 223–240 (hereafter cited as: TSM),

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  37. and H. R. Bowen, Chairman, National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, Applying Technology to Unmet Needs, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1966, pp. v–138; hereafter cited as: Applying Technology. See also K. E. Boulding, ‘Basis’, in Hook, HV and EP, pp. 67–68, and E. J. Mishan, CBA (note 12), pp. 393–394. Externalities (also known as ‘spillovers’, ‘diseconomies’, or ‘disamenities’) are social benefits or costs (e.g., the cost of factory pollution to homeowners nearby) which are not taken account of either in the cost of the goods produced (e.g., by the factory) or by the factory owner. They are ‘external’ to cost-benefit calculation, and hence do not enter the calculation of the market price.

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  38. For this reason, says Mishan(The Costs of Economic Growth, Praeger, New York, 1967, p. 53; hereafter cited as: CEG), “one can no longer take it for granted that the market price of a good is an index of its marginal price to society”. Another way of making this same point (Mishan, CEG, p. 57) is to say that diseconomies cause social marginal costs of some goods to exceed their corresponding private marginal costs; this means that the social value of some goods is significantly less than the (private) market price.

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  39. See K. E. Boulding, ‘Basis’, in Hook, HV and EP, pp. 67–68, and E. F. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered, Harper, New York, 1973, pp. 38–49; hereafter cited as: Small.

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  40. See, for example, A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, Macmillan, London, 1932, and Mishan, WE (note 11).

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  41. Mishan, ESD (note 12), p. 69.

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  42. See Self, PPCBA (note 2), pp. 76–86; see also pp. 71–72.

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  43. A. L. Sorkin, Economic Aspects of Natural Hazards, Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1982, p. 62; hereafter cited as: Sorkin EANH.

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  44. D. W. Pearce, ‘Introduction’, in Pearce (ed.), The Valuation of Social Cost, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1978, p. 2; hereafter cited as Pearce, ‘Introduction’, and Pearce, Valuation.

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  45. See Martin Hollis and Edward Nell, Rational Economic Man, Cambridge University Press, London, 1975, who claim that neoclassical economics rests essentially on a pos-itivistic philosophy of science.

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  46. R.M. Hare, Methods (note 11), p. 76.

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  47. Mishan, CBA (note 12), p. 161, notes this fact.

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  48. Quoted by B. M. Gross, ‘Preface’, in R. A. Bauer (ed.), Social Indicators, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1966, p. xiii; hereafter cited as: Bauer, SI. See also Bauer, ‘Detection and Anticipation of Impact: the Nature of the Task’, in Bauer, SI, pp. 36–48

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  49. R. M. Hare, ‘Contrasting Methods of Environmental Planning’, in Goodpaster and Sayre, Ethics, pp. 64, 65, and D. E. Kash, Director of the Science and Public Policy Program, University of Oklahoma, in Congress of the US, Technology Assessment Activities in the Industrial, Academic, and Governmental Communities. Hearings Before the Technology Assessment Board of the Office of Technology Assessment, 94th Congress, Second Session, June 8–10, 14, 1976, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1976, p. 198. Hereafter cited as: Congress, TA in IAG.

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  50. W. D. Rowe, An Anatomy of Risk, John Wiley, New York, 1977, p. 431; hereafter cited as: Rowe, Risk.

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  51. O. Morgenstern, On the Accuracy of Economic Observations, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1963, pp. 35, 63; hereafter cited as: Morgenstern, Accuracy.

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  52. Self, PPCBA, pp. 91–92; see also pp. 78–79.

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  53. Bauer, Detection, in Bauer, SI (note 36), p. 46.

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  54. See K. S. Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear Power and Public Policy, D. Reidel, Boston, 1980, pp. 55–59. Here the author shows that if nonmarket costs (for storing radioactive wastes) are added to the RCBA then, contrary to the accepted government conclusion, nuclear-generated electricity is more expensive, per kilowatt-hour, than that from coal.

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  55. A. Lovins, ‘Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessment in Energy Policy’, George Washington Law Review 45 (5), (August 1977), 930; hereafter cited as: Lovins, CRBA.

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  56. R. M. Hare, Methods (note 11), pp. 64, 68, 70.

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  57. Self, PPCBA, pp. 165–171.

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  58. Self, PPCBA, p. 166.

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  59. Self, PPCBA, p. 171.

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  60. Self, PPCBA, p. 169–170.

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  61. Self, PPCBA, p. 166.

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  62. Self, PPCBA, p. 89.

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  63. L. Lave and E. Seskin, ‘Air Pollution and Human Health’, Science 169 (3947), (1970), 723–733

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  64. D. Rice, Estimating the Cost of Illness. PHS Publication No. 947–6, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1966.

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  65. See E. Rappoport, ‘Remarks on the Economic Theory of Life Value’, in D. Okrent (ed.), Risk-Benefit Methodology and Application, UCLA School of Engineering and Applied Science, Los Angeles, 1975, pp. 609–613. See also Rowe, Risk (note 37), pp. 225–226.

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  66. B. M. Gross, ‘The State of the Nation’, in Bauer, SI (note 36), p. 168.

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  67. Gunnar Myrdal, Against the Stream, Random House, New York, 1973, p. 168; hereafter cited as: Myrdal, AS. See also note 52.

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  68. Stevens, Measurement (note 18), p. 61.

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  69. Mishan, ESD (note 12), p. 19. See also Mishan, CBA (note 12), p. 382.

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  70. Lovins, CRBA (note 43), p. 938.

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  71. T. C. Means, ‘The Concorde Calculus’, George Washington Law Review 45 (5), (August 1977), 1061–1062

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  72. hereafter cited as: Means, CC. See also W. R. McCarey, ‘Pesticide Regulation’, George Washington Law Review 45 (5), (August 1977), 1093–1094; hereafter cited as: McCarey, Pesticide.

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  73. Mishan, ESD (note 12), pp. 19–20.

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  74. A. D. Biderman, ‘Social Indicators and Goals’, in Bauer, SI (note 36), p. 101.

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  75. Norman S. Care, ‘Participation and Policy’, Ethics 88 (1), (July 1978), 316–337, has an excellent discussion of this point; hereafter cited as: Participation.

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  76. Mishan, CBA (note 12), p. 160. G. L. S. Shackle, Epistemics and Economics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 45–47; hereafter cited as: Shackle, E. and E. Georgescu-Roegen, AE (note 9), p. 196, makes a similar point.

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  77. Gunnar Myrdal, The Political Element in the Development of Economic Theory, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1955, p. 89; hereafter cited as: Myrdal, PED.

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  78. Mishan, ESD, p. 21. Similar points are raised by Self, PPCBA, pp. 73–80; Myrdal, AS (note 53), p. 149; Lovins, CRBA (note 42), pp. 925–926; Georgescu-Roegen, AE (note 9) pp. 17ff., 47ff.; E. Rotwein, ‘Mathematical Economies’, in S. R. Krupp (ed.), The Structure of Economic Science, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1966, p. 102; hereafter cited as: Rotwein, ME, and Krupp, Structure. See also Green, CRBA (note 12), p. 905.

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  79. Lovins, CRBA (note 42), p. 927.

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  80. A. Radomysler, ‘Welfare Economics and Economic Policy’, in K. J. Arrow and T. Scitovsky (eds.), Readings in Welfare Economics, Homewood, Illinois, Irwin, 1969, p. 89; hereafter cited as: Radomysler, Welfare, and Arrow and Scitovsky, Welfare.

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  81. Georgescu-Roegen, AE (note 9), p. 52.

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  82. See note 54.

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  83. See, for example, S. S. Stevens, Measurement (note 18), pp. 36–42.

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  84. See, for example, Pearce, ‘Introduction’ (note 32) and A. L. Sorkin, Economic Aspects of Natural Hazards, Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1982, pp. 59–74; hereafter cited as: Sorkin, EANH.

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  85. See, for example, Richard Brandt, ‘The Concept of Welfare’, in S. R. Krupp, Structure (note 64), pp. 257–276.

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  86. John C. Harsanyi, ‘Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility’, in K. J. Arrow and T. Scitovsky, Readings in Welfare Economics, R. D. Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1969, p. 55; hereafter cited as: Harsanyi, CW, and Arrow and Scitovsky, Welfare.

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  87. See Stevens, Measurement (note 18), pp. 21–22.

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  88. R. P. Wolff, ‘The Derivation of the Minimal State’, in Jeffrey Paul (ed.), Reading Nozick, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa, N.J., 1981, pp. 99; hereafter cited as: Wolff, Derivation, in Paul, RN.

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  89. Wolff, Derivation, p. 101.

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  90. Stuart Hampshire, ‘Morality and Pessimism’, in Hampshire (ed.), Public and Private Morality, University Press, Cambridge, 1978, p. 5.

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  91. B. M. Gross, ‘The State of the Nation’, in Bauer, SI (note 36), p. 168. See also H. Skolimowski, ‘Technology Assessment as a Critique of Civilization’, in R. S. Cohen, et al., PSA 1974, D. Reidel, Boston, 1976, pp. 459–465, esp. p. 461.

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  92. D. MacLean, ‘Quantified Risk Assessment and the Quality of Life’, in Dorothy Zinberg (ed.), Uncertain Power, Pergamon Press, New York, 1983, Section V; hereafter cited as: MacLean, QRA.

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  93. MacLean, QRA, Section V.

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  94. Self, PPCBA (note 3), p. 69.

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  95. This same point is made by numerous economists. See, for example, Self, PPCBA, p. 68, and A. Kneese, S. Ben-David, W. Schulze, ‘A Study of the Ethical Foundations of Benefit-Cost Analysis Techniques’. Working Paper, unpublished, August 1979, p. 23; hereafter cited as: EF.

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  96. This same point is made by Pearce, ‘Introduction’ (note 32), p. 3.

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  97. N. Georgescu-Roegen, AE (note 9), p. 33. See also G. L. S. Shackle, Epistemics and Economics, University Press, Cambridge, 1972, pp. 8–9.

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  98. See Self, PPCBA (note 3), pp. 70–75 and A. Lovins, ‘Cost-Risk-Benefit Assessment in Energy Policy’, George Washington Law Review 45 (5), (1977), 925ff.; hereafter cited as CRBA.

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  99. E. Mishan, CBA (note 12), p. 407.

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  100. See note 31.

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  101. H. P. Green, ‘Legal and Political Dimensions of Risk-Benefit Methodology, in D. Okrent (ed.), Risk-Benefit Methodology and Application, UCLA School of Engineering and Applied Science, Los Angeles, 1975, UCLA-ENG 7598, pp. 287–289; hereafter cited as: RBM.

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  102. Boulding, ‘Basis’ (note 23), p. 64. See also Anderson, Social Value (note 23), p. 13.

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  103. L. Lave, ‘Discussion’, in Mitre Corporation (note 7), p. 181.

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  104. C. A. Nash, ‘The Theory of Social Cost Measurement’, in Pearce, Valuation (note 32), p. 8; hereafter cited as: Nash, SCM.

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  105. Pearce, ‘Introduction’ (note 32), p. 7.

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  106. J. Burton, ‘Epilogue’, in S. Cheung, The Myth of Social Cost, Institute of Economic Affairs, Lancing, Sussex, 1978, p. 90; hereafter cited as: Burton, Epilogue, in Cheung, Myth.

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  107. C. K. Rowley, ‘Prologue’, in Cheung, Myth, pp. 11–12. See also Cheung, Myth, p. 21.

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  108. This same point is made by D. W. Pearce, Valuation (note 32), pp. 134–135.

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  109. This example is taken from K. S. Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear Power and Public Policy, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1983, pp. 115–116; hereafter cited as: Nuclear Power.

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  110. Morgenstern, Accuracy (note 24), p. 125.

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  111. J. Primack and F. von Hippel, Advice and Dissent: Scientists in the Political Arena, Basic Books, New York, 1974, p. 33.

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  112. C. Starr, Current Issues in Energy, Pergamon, New York, 1979, p. 11.

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  113. L. Lave, ‘Discussion’, in Mitre Corporation (note 7), p. 177, makes this same point.

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  114. This objection was raised by Dr. Stanley Carpenter (of Georgia Institute of Technology) in a private conversation. For a related objection and a response to it, see Alex C. Michalos, ‘A Reconsideration of the Idea of a Science Court’, Research in Philosophy and Technology 3 (1980), 26–27.

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  115. A. Van Horn and R. Wilson, The Status of Risk-Benefit Analysis, Energy and Environmental Policy Center, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University, 1976, discussion paper, p. 4.

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  116. Mishan, CBA (note 12), p. 383.

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  117. This is an important point in my argument. Rather than go into an extended discussion and defense of it here, which would take me too far afield, I recommend the reader to an excellent article, Care, Participation (note 60). Care establishes the point in question.

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  118. L. Lave, ‘Panel: Public Perceptions of Risk’, in Mitre Corporation (note 7), p. 577.

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  119. S. Stevens, ‘Measurement’ (note 18), pp. 18–19.

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  120. B. M. Gross, ‘The State of the Nation: Social Systems Accounting’, in Bauer, SI (note 36), p. 222. See also p. 260, where Gross discusses the ‘selectivity-comprehensiveness paradox’. There is a tension, perhaps resulting from the prevalence of the application of Gresham’s Law, between choosing to measure quantitatively only a few parameters (‘selectivity’) and deciding to attempt to measure quantitatively a more comprehensive list of items (‘comprehensiveness’). When one opts for the former, he gets an exact, but irrelevant indicator. When he chooses a more comprehensive list of values to quantify, he obtains a more relevant (i.e., appUcable, realistic, or usable) indicator, but a much less exact one, since he necessarily encounters more difficulty in quantifying qualitative or subjective factors. Hence, even if Gresham’s Law is avoided via quantification, one still faces considerable difficulty in the form of this paradox. Authors who make similar points include Mishan, CEG, p. xx; John Davoll, ‘Systematic Distortion in Planning and Assessment’, in D. F. Burkhardt and W. H. Ittelson (eds.), Environmental Assessment of Socioeconomic Systems, Plenum, New York, 1978, p. 12 (hereafter cited as: Burkhardt and Ittelson, EA)

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  121. A. R. Tamplin and J. W. Gofman, Population Control Through Nuclear Pollution, Nelson-Hall, Chicago, 1970, p. 82; and R. A. Bauer, ‘Detection and Anticipation of Impact: the Nature of the Task’, in Bauer, SI (note 36), p. 35.

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  122. E. Mishan, ESD (note 10), p. 109.

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  123. A. Sorkin, EANH (note 31), p. 62.

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  124. H. Siebert, Economics of the Environment, D. C. Heath, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1981, pp. 16–18.

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  125. Thjs is Mishan’s line of reasoning. He claims (CBA, p. 267) that it is better to describe the effect than to give it an arbitrary value through quantification. He favors providing “a physical description of the spillovers and some idea of their significance”, but not quantifying them, because they can’t be “measured with honesty” (pp. 160–161).

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  126. Self, PPCBA (note 3), p. 92.

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  127. Self, PPCBA (note 3), p. 92.

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  128. F. Y. Edgeworth, Papers Relating to Political Economy, Royal Economic Society, London, 1925, III, p. 182.

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  129. K. Boulding, Economics as a Science, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1970, pp. 120–121.

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  130. This same argument is used by W. S. Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy, Kelley and Millman, New York, 1957, pp. 7–10.

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  131. A similar point is made by C. W. Churchman, ‘On the Intercomparison of Utilities’, in S. Krupp, SES (note 12), p. 256.

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  132. A similar point is made by Self, PPCBA (note 3), p. 83.

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  133. A similar point is made by R. C. Lind, ‘The Analysis of Benefit-Risk Relationship’, in Committee on Public Engineering Policy, Perspectives on Benefit-Risk Decision Making, National Academy of Engineering, Washington, D. C., 1972, p. 110.

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  134. Mishan, CBA (note 12), p. 161, uses a similar example to illustrate a somewhat different point.

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  135. Congress, TA in IAG (note 36), pp. 248–250.

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  136. Congress, OTA, Pest Management Strategies, vol. 2, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1979, pp. 48–51, 68–81.

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  137. Congress, OTA, Oil Transportation by Tankers: An Analysis of Marine Pollution and Safety Measures, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1975, pp. 26–37, 173; hereafter cited as: Oil Tankers.

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  138. Congress, OTA, Oil Tankers, pp. 38–71.

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  139. Congress, OTA, An Evaluation of Railroad Safety, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1978, p. xi; hereafter cited as: RR.

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  140. Information concerning these problems was taken from Congress, OTA, RR, pp. 14, 141–161, and Congress, OTA, Railroad Safety — US — Canadian Comparison, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1979, pp. vii–xi; hereafter cited as: RR-US-C.

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  141. Congress, OTA, RR, p. 37.

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  142. Congress, OTA, RR, p. 160.

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  143. Congress, OTA, RR, pp. x—xi, 125.

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  144. Congress of the US, Office of Technology Assessment, A Technology Assessment of Coal Slurry Pipelines, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1978, p. 84; hereafter cited as: Congress, OTA, Coal Slurry.

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  145. Congress, OTA, Coal Slurry, pp. 84, 99. For discussion of the problem of ‘pricing’ natural resources, see M. A. Lutz and K. Lux, The Challenge of Humanistic Economics, Benjamin/Cummings, London, 1979, pp. 297–308, esp. 305–307.

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  146. Congress, OTA, Coal Slurry, p. 15.

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  147. Congress, OTA, Transportation of Liquefied Natural Gas, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1977, p. 42; hereafter cited as: LNG.

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  148. Congress, OTA, LNG, p. 62. See also pp. 63, 66.

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  149. See note 131.

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  150. Congress, OTA, LNG, p. 8.

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  151. See Congress, OTA, Policy Implications of the Computed Tomography (CT) Scanner, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1978, pp. iii, 9, 105; hereafter cited as: Scanner.

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  152. See Congress, OTA, Scanner, pp. 8, 67, 71, 105; this conclusion is based on the facts that most head scans are done merely because of headaches and, in the absence of other abnormalities, are almost always negative. Even with other symptoms, up to 90% of all head scans are negative.

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  153. Congress, OTA, Scanner, p. 38. This dose is 177 times greater than the average annual dose of radiation to which a person is exposed.

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  154. Calculational data from government dose-response studies and from the BEIR report may be found in K. S. Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear Power (note 94), p. 26; see also p. 115 for calculations regarding genetic deaths of offspring when parents are exposed to radiation; genetic deaths are higher, by a factor of 10, than induced cancers when equal amounts of radiation exposure occur. Cost-estimate data for cancers and genetic deaths may be computed on the basis of the discussion throughout Jones-Lee, Value (note 11).

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  155. Congress, OTA, Scanner, p. 105.

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  156. Congress, OTA, Scanner, pp. 8, 71.

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  157. See note 138.

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  158. For a complete analysis of this example, see K. S. Shrader-Frechette, Nuclear Power (note 94), pp. 49–68.

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  159. Stobaugh and Yergin, ‘Conclusion’, in Stobaugh and Yergin, EF, pp. 216–233, esp. p. 227; see also Congress, OTA, Application of Solar Technology to Today’s Energy Needs, Vol. 1, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1975, pp. 3, 12, 21; hereafter cited as: Solar I.

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  160. Congress, OTA, Solar I, p. 3.

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  161. For British statistics, see M. R. McDowell and D. F. Cooper, ‘Control Methodology of the U.K. Road Traffic System’, in Burkhardt and Ittelson,&4, pp. 279–298. For US data, see Congress, OTA, Technology Assessment of Changes in the Future Use and Characteristics of the Automobile Transportation System, 2 vols. US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1979, vol. 1 pp. 16, 21, 25–31; hereafter cited as: Auto I or Auto II.

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  162. See note 145.

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  163. See Congress, OTA, Auto I, p. 25.

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  164. Congress, OTA, Auto I, p. 31.

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  165. Congress, Auto II, p. 251; see also pp. 75–295.

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  166. Congress, OTA, Auto I, p. 25.

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  1. Department of Philosophy, University of Florida, USA

    K. S. Shrader-Frechette

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© 1985 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Shrader-Frechette, K.S. (1985). RCBA and the Assumption of Partial Quantification. In: Science Policy, Ethics, and Economic Methodology. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6449-5_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6449-5_6

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