On the Inconsistency of Meinong’s Ontology
My aim in this paper is to give an analysis of the logical difficulties which are present in some of the main theses in Meinong’s ontology. These theses have been criticized by logicians since 1905, the same year Russell published “On Denoting” in Mind, posing serious objections to Meinong’s doctrines and giving an alternative theory, by setting up his well-known theory of descriptions. Nevertheless, a new study of this question is justified, as we shall see later, because Russell’s arguments are not as conclusive as one might think than to be at first glance. One of his arguments is based on a misinterpretation of the theory he attacks, and the rest of them lose some of their strength due to Meinong’s replies to his objections.
KeywordsDefinite Description Ordinary Language Ontological Theory Impossible Object Existent Object
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