Abstract
My aim in this paper is to give an analysis of the logical difficulties which are present in some of the main theses in Meinong’s ontology. These theses have been criticized by logicians since 1905, the same year Russell published “On Denoting” in Mind, posing serious objections to Meinong’s doctrines and giving an alternative theory, by setting up his well-known theory of descriptions. Nevertheless, a new study of this question is justified, as we shall see later, because Russell’s arguments are not as conclusive as one might think than to be at first glance. One of his arguments is based on a misinterpretation of the theory he attacks, and the rest of them lose some of their strength due to Meinong’s replies to his objections.
This paper was written in July 1971 but was not published until October 1972 in Cuadernos de Filosofía (Facultad de Filosofía y Letra, Universidad de Buenos Aires), no. 14 (1970), 327–344. After its publication, Professor Hector-Neri Castaneda wrote several papers developing an interesting and sophisticated “neo-Meinongian” theory. These papers, some letters and several discussions with the author in February 1979 gave me enough encouragement to proceed with the investigation of these problems. As a consequence of this, I have changed my mind in several respects and I am preparing other papers on neo-Meinongian approaches. Nevertheless, I think this is a good opportunity both to add a 1982 Postscript to show in which respects sane of the theses developed in the present article have changed and to include some news about literature which has appeared during the last years on the subjects dealt with here. I would like to acknowledge my profound indebtedness to Professor Castañeda for his help and for the considerable enrichment that my understanding has aoquired on the ontological questions I discuss here thanks to him. Finally, I would also like to acknowledge Lourdes Valdivia and Raymundo Morado, researchers in the IIF, UNAM, Mexico, for the translation of this paper into English.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Cf. Meinong, Ueber Moeglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit (Leipzig: Barth, 1915), pp. 278 and 282, Gesammelte Abhandlungen, vol. II (Leipzig, Barth), pp. 493–4 (Cited by Findlay, op. cit., pp. 50, 105 ).
Cf. Russell, Principles of Mathematics ( New York: The Norton Library, 1964 ), p. 449.
Cf. Anthony Kenny, “Descartes’ Ontological Argument,” included in Joseph Margolis (ed.), Fact and Existence ( Oxford: Blackwell, 1969 ), p. 33.
Wonfilio Trejo, “Russell: Descripción y existencia,” Critica, Revista Hispanoamericana de Filosofía 2 (1968), especially pp. 89 and 93.
Reinhardt Grossmann, Meinong (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974; Héctor-Neri Castañeda, “Thinking and the Structure of the World,” Philosophia 4 (1974), 3–40, “Individuation and Non-Identity; A New Look,” American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1975), 131-40, “Identity and Sameness,” Philosophia (1975), 121–50, “Philosophical Method and the Theory of Predication and Identity,”
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1984 D. Reidel Publishing Company
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Orayen, R. (1984). On the Inconsistency of Meinong’s Ontology. In: Garcia, J.J.E., Rabossi, E., Villanueva, E., Dascal, M. (eds) Philosophical Analysis in Latin America. Synthese Library, vol 172. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6375-7_7
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6375-7_7
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-009-6377-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-6375-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive