The Limits of the Enforcement of Morality Through the Criminal Law

Abstract

What are the limits of the state power to punish people for the performance of some acts? This is an old and complex question. One of its facets is related to the issue of whether or not the mere immorality of an act provides a prima facie reason for resorting to the threat and imposition of punishment against the person who intends to perform or actually performs that act. The competing positions on this particular issue have extensive ramifications which reach out into several aspects of the adjudication of criminal responsibility and presuppose radically different views of society. The purposes of this article are, first, to identify and to distinguish the social conceptions underlying the opposite answers to the aforementioned question, and, secondly, to show sane of the implications that each of those answers has for a system of criminal law.

This article is a modified version of a chapter of my thesis accepted by the University of Oxford for the Doctor of Philosophy degree. I express my gratitude to my supervisors D. J. M. Finnis and Professor A.M. Honore and to my examiners Professor H. L. A. Hart and P. F. Skegg for their illuminating comments and objections.

This article is a modified version of a chapter of my thesis accepted by the University of Oxford for the Doctor of Philosophy degree. I express my gratitude to my supervisors D. J. M. Finnis and Professor A.M. Honore and to my examiners Professor H. L. A. Hart and P. F. Skegg for their illuminating comments and objections.