Legal Principles and Legal Positivism

  • Genaro R. Carrió
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 172)


The main purpose of this article is to question the soundness of a recent attack on legal positivism launched by Professor Ronald M. Dworkin in his essay “Is law a system of rules?”1 I do not think any preliminary explanation of the strategy of my argument is necessary except for my use of a model taken from the rules of a game. I am aware of the important differences existing between legal norms and rules of games. But in spite of these differences law, as a normative structure, shares some problematic features with other normative structures, those of games included, and the following non-legal model does, I think, throw light on some of the main issues discussed later.


Variable Standard Specific Rule Legal Order Legal Norm Legal Principle 
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  1. 3.
    Cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, ch. II ( New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1964 ).Google Scholar

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© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1984

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  • Genaro R. Carrió

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