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Natural Conjectures

  • Joäo Paulo Monteiro
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 172)

Abstract

I. How do ccmnon sense and theoretical knowledge relate to each other? Hume seems to suggest a smooth and swift continuity between both: “Philosophical decisions are nothing but the reflections of common life, methodized and corrected.” Philosophical inquiry is characterized by the search for evermore general principles, but this transition has already begun at the level of common sense: “From our earliest infancy we make continual advances in forming more general principles of conduct and reasoning;… the larger experience we acquire, and the stronger reason we are endowed with, we always render our principles the more general and comprehensive; and… what we call philosophy is nothing but a more regular and methodical operation of the same kind.”

Keywords

Common Sense Common Knowledge Theoretical Knowledge Inductive Inference Ontological Relativity 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1984

Authors and Affiliations

  • Joäo Paulo Monteiro

There are no affiliations available

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