Abstract
In the past twenty one years the possibility or impossibility of a private language has been discussed with a certain degree of obsession. The name “Private Language Argument”1 covers a multiplicity of different issues. Some philosophers want to see in the PLA a paradigm of philosophical argument with devastating consequences for the Cartesian Thesis on the Philosophy of Mind and the Metaphysics of Persons;2 others only see obscure statements that in no case make an argument or a definite point.
Originally published in Crítica, Revista Latinoamericana de Filosofía 7 (1975). The first part is translated in its entirety (with minor alterations). For reasons of space, only a summary of the second part is given.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
A. J. Ayer, “Can There Be a Private Language?” in O. R. Jones, ed., The Private Language Argument ( New York: Macmillan, 1971 ), p. 277.
J. Cook, “Wittgenstein on Privacy,” in G. Pitcher, Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations ( New York: Maonillan, 1968 ), p. 289–96.
C. Ginet, “Wittgenstein’s Argument That One Cannot Obey a Rule Privately,” Nous (1970), p. 363.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1984 D. Reidel Publishing Company
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Villanueva, E. (1984). The Private Language Argument. In: Garcia, J.J.E., Rabossi, E., Villanueva, E., Dascal, M. (eds) Philosophical Analysis in Latin America. Synthese Library, vol 172. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6375-7_14
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6375-7_14
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-009-6377-1
Online ISBN: 978-94-009-6375-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive