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A Modal Argument

  • Chapter
Theism

Part of the book series: Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy ((PSSP,volume 30))

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Abstract

The following is a version of a familiar type of modal argument for God’s existence:

  1. (a)

    Since the concept of God is the concept of a being than which no greater being is logically possible, the concept of God is such that it is true in each possible world that if God exists in that world, then it is logically impossible for him to fail to exist there, i.e., his existence in that world is logically necessary.

  2. (b)

    There is a possible world, W, in which God exists.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, USA

    Clement Dore

Authors
  1. Clement Dore
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© 1984 D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland

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Dore, C. (1984). A Modal Argument. In: Theism. Philosophical Studies Series in Philosophy, vol 30. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6300-9_5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-009-6300-9_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-009-6302-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-009-6300-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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