Confucian Moral Metaphysics and Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology

  • Wing-Cheuk Chan
Part of the Analecta Husserliana book series (ANHU, volume 17)


Confucianism has been the major school of Chinese philosophy. Phenomenology arose in this century and formed a main current in Western philosophy. Thanks to the elaborated reconstruction of traditional Confucianism by Mou Tzung-sana — an important representative of contemporary Confucianism — the moral-metaphysical character of Confucian philosophy was rediscovered. On the other hand, Heidegger’s fundamental ontology has provided us with a radical development of phenomenology.


Moral Activity Chinese Philosophy Moral Praxis Confucian Philosophy Fundamental Ontology 
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Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1984

Authors and Affiliations

  • Wing-Cheuk Chan
    • 1
  1. 1.Tunghai UniversityTaichungTaiwan

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